This repository has been archived by the owner on Jul 17, 2020. It is now read-only.
-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 2
/
ch1-7.html
372 lines (326 loc) · 18.8 KB
/
ch1-7.html
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
<!DOCTYPE HTML>
<HTML>
<HEAD>
<title>Chariots For Apollo, ch1-7</title>
<meta http-equiv=Content-Type content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
</head>
<BODY BGCOLOR="#FFFFFF">
<p>
<h2>The Feasibility Studies</h2>
<p>
The Space Task Group had published the formal Request for Proposal on 12
September 1960. Eighty-eight firms sent representatives to the bidders'
briefing, but only sixty-three picked up forms. By 9 October, NASA had
received 14 bids.<a href = "#explanation1">*</a> Many aerospace firms
teamed up, either in partnership or as subcontractors, to vie for the
awards.<p>
All bidders were told that even the losers should continue their
efforts, thus strengthening their chances in competing for the hardware
phase of Apollo. NASA assured them that the agency would not limit its
choice of the designer and builder of the spacecraft to the three
selected study contractors. Space Task Group people met later with
representatives from the losing firms, discussed the weaknesses in their
proposals, and offered to work with them informally to overcome these
failings.<a href = "#source42">42</a><p>
Donlan and contracting officer Glenn F. Bailey prepared a detailed plan
for the orderly evaluation of proposals, to begin on 10 October. Five
technical panels were set up, and Donlan was appointed chairman of the
evaluation board. Besides Faget and Piland (with Goett and Gilruth as ex
officio members), Donlan's board consisted of Disher (NASA Office of
Space Flight Programs), Alvin Seiff (Ames), John V. Becker (Langley),
and Koelle (Marshall).<a href = "#source43">43</a><p>
On 25 October, after the panels had compared the bidders' proposals in
trajectory analysis, guidance and control, human factors and radiation,
onboard systems, and systems integration, Goett announced the winners:
the teams led by Convair/Astronautics of San Diego, General Electric of
Philadelphia, and the Martin Company of Baltimore. Contracts of $250,000
were awarded to each of the three.<p>
Convair/Astronautics operated under a more complicated arrangement than
the other two winners, using its Fort Worth division for radiation and
heat protection, its San Diego plant for life support studies, the
Lovelace Foundation and Clinic in Albuquerque for aerospace medicine,
and the Avco Corporation's Research and Advanced Development Division in
Wilmington, Massachusetts, for data on reentry vehicle design. General
Electric's Missile and Space Vehicle Department teamed with Bell
Aerosystems Company. Martin decided to go the whole route alone.<a href
= "#source44">44</a><p>
Members of the Space Task Group who monitored the three study contracts
developed into a fourth group, working out their own advanced designs
just as the contractors were doing. Jack Funk, Stanley H. Cohn, and Alan
Kehlet, for example, concentrated on trajectory analysis; Chilton,
Richard R. Carley, and Howard C. Kyle studied guidance and control;
Johnston, Harold I. Johnson, C. Patrick Laughlin, James P. Nolan, Jr.,
and Robert B. Voas investigated the human factors area; and John B. Lee,
Richard B. Ferguson, and Ralph S. Sawyer looked into designs for onboard
systems. This sort of work gave them the confidence they needed to act
as monitors for the study contractors and an opportunity to compare
their designs with those submitted by industrial experts. Most
significantly, perhaps, the systems integration crowd (members who were
studying how all the pieces would fit together) - Caldwell Johnson, Owen
E. Maynard, Strass, Robert E. Vale, and Kenneth C. Weston - soon decided
that the Space Task Group's own preliminary design was a good one.<a
href = "#source45">45</a><p>
When the time came to draw up early specifications for Apollo - the
technical aspects of the program - NASA Headquarters left its spacecraft
and booster design people alone. The tasks of these two groups, still in
the preliminary stage, were so well separated that there was no real
need as yet for any arbitration of the problems that might arise when
Gilruth's spacecraft group and von Braun's launch vehicle team began
putting their pieces of the space vehicle together.<a href =
"#source46">46</a><p>
Washington had, as a matter of fact, a more pressing problem on its
hands: where to locate the center that would conduct future manned space
flight activities. Glennan had begun to question the wisdom of moving
the Space Task Group to Goddard after Mercury ended. The new center
was becoming more and more occupied with unmanned space science
programs, which Glennan did not want to see diluted and engulfed by
manned space flight. On 1 September 1960, Robert C. Seamans, Jr.,
replaced Richard Homer as Associate Administrator. That same day,
Seamans talked with Glennan about the future home of manned space
flight. Goett and Gilruth had discussed the matter and had concluded
that Gilruth should ask for separate center status for his group.<a href
= "#source47">47</a><p>
[Image here]<p>
<cite>Caldwell C. Johnson's October 1960 sketch proposed the seating
arrangement that was developed and adopted for the Apollo command
module. The fourth figure illustrates the sleeping position.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
At the end of the month, Glennan called for a special study of the
relocation. A four-man team headed by Bruce Lundin began by collecting
opinions from about 20 officials in the field and in Washington.
Glennan's order basically restricted the candidate sites to an existing
major NASA installation near which a proposed life sciences center might
be built, insisted that Mercury not be disrupted by the move, and
recognized that Apollo would use contractor participation to a far
larger extent than Mercury. Glennan also decreed that Marshall, Lewis,
and the High Speed Flight Station were not to be considered, which left
only Ames and Langley as possible sites.<p>
Lundin and his teammates Wesley Hjornevik, Ernest O. Pearson, Jr., and
Addison M. Rothrock found their task difficult. Senior NASA officials
did agree that manned space flight would soon need a center of its own.
But where it should be and how it would be integrated into existing
facilities was, it seemed, going to be a major issue. Lundin's group,
after many administrative, political, and technical compromises,
recommended rather weakly that manned space flight activity should
probably be relocated in 1961 to Ames in California.<a href =
"#source48">48</a><p>
Gilruth, his technical assistant Paul E. Purser, and others leading the
Space Task Group, who may not have been enthusiastic about the prospect
of being uprooted from their Virginia homes, had little time to worry
about a move. Mercury-Atlas 1 had exploded in mid-air on 29 July, and
morale among its managers was at its nadir. Unless these troubles could
be overcome there might be little point in moving - there might not even
be a Mercury program, much less a more advanced project. Gilruth was
hard pressed to spare even enough of his experts to proceed with the
feasibility studies for Apollo.<a href = "#source49">49</a><p>
The three successful bidders began discussions with the Space Task Group
on the technical aspects of their tasks almost immediately, with General
Electric visiting its Langley-based monitors first. Donlan appointed
three liaison engineers to act as single points of contact for the
studies: Herbert G. Patterson for General Electric, John Lee for Martin,
and William Petynia for Convair. Monthly meetings between these special
monitors and the contractors kept Donlan and Piland informed of
progress.<a href = "#source50">50</a><p>
The industry conferences and the awarding of the feasibility contracts
attracted the attention of the White House staff. George B.
Kistiakowsky, Eisenhower's special assistant for science and technology,
assigned Donald F. Hornig of the President's Science Advisory Committee
(PSAC) to the chairmanship of a six-man ad hoc Panel on Man-in-Space.<a
href = "#explanation2">**</a> This group would investigate both NASA's
activities thus far and its goals, missions, and costs in the
foreseeable future. After several field trips, Hornig's panel reported:
"As far as we can tell, the NASA program is well thought through,
and we believe that the mission, schedules and cost are as realistic as
possible at this time."<p>
Obviously, the report continued, "any of the routes to land a man
on the moon [will] require a development much more ambitious than the
present Saturn program," calling not only for larger boosters but
for lunar landing and takeoff stages as well. "Nevertheless . . .
this new major step is implicit in the present Saturn program, for the
first really big achievement of the man-in-space program would be the
lunar landing."<a href = "#source51">51</a><p>
The cost of the moon landing would be determined to a great extent by
the effort to develop, build, and qualify an extra-large and undefined
Nova. Basing its estimates on Saturn costs to date, the PSAC panel
placed this figure anywhere from $25 to $38 billion. Rendezvous schemes,
as then envisioned, would afford little fiscal advantage: "Present
indications suggest that alternative methods . . . of accomplishing the
manned lunar landing mission could not be expected to alter
substantially the over-all cost." In addition to its analysis of
America's booster program in relation to a lunar landing objective,
Hornig's panel summarized the worldwide significance of an expanded
national space effort. "We have been plunged into a race for the
conquest of outer space," the group said:
<blockquote><p>As a reason for this undertaking some look to the new and
exciting scientific discoveries which are certain to be made. Others
feel the challenge to transport man beyond frontiers he scarcely dared
dream about until now. But at present the most impelling reason for our
effort has been the international political situation which demands that
we demonstrate our technological capabilities if we are to maintain our
position of leadership. For all of these reasons we have embarked on a
complex and costly adventure.<a href =
"#source52">52</a></blockquote><p>
Early in 1960 Glennan had established a Space Exploration Program
Council to oversee program planning and implementation. Near the end of
the year, Seamans thought it wise to convene that body. Goett, von
Braun, William H. Pickering, Ira H. Abbott, Silverstein, Major General
Don R. Ostrander, and Albert F. Siepert met with Seamans on 30 September
for a briefing by George Low on "Saturn Requirements for Project
Apollo." Low posed five questions and defended his answers to them
as proof of the realism of the proposed schedule for Apollo: (1) Will
the spacecraft be ready in time to meet the Saturn schedule? (2) Will
the spacecraft weight be within Saturn capabilities? (3) Are there any
foreseeable technological roadblocks? (4) Will solar flare radiation
prevent circumlunar flights by men? (5) What are the costs for this
program?<p>
To each of the five questions, Low made positive assertions of
competence and capability. He argued that an Apollo circumlunar
prototype spacecraft could be ready in three to four years, a production
vehicle in twice that time. Space Task Group weight estimates showed a
reasonable margin between the weight of the spacecraft and the payload
the C-2 Saturn could be expected to boost. No insurmountable
technological obstacles were anticipated, Low said, not even reentry
heating or solar flare radiation. Low concluded that the current cost
level of $100 million a year would eventually rise to approximately $400
million annually. All of these considerations, in his opinion, argued
for an immediate decision to go ahead. But the fact that this planning
aimed at lunar circumnavigation rather than lunar landing seemed to be
blocking approval of Apollo. NASA's top administrators appeared hesitant
to fight for a mere flyby mission to the moon.<a href =
"#source53">53</a><p>
Low recognized this reluctance and on 17 October told Silverstein he was
taking another tack:
<blockquote><p>It has become increasingly apparent that a preliminary
program for manned lunar landings should be formulated. This is
necessary . . . to provide a proper justification for Apollo, and to
place Apollo schedules and technical plans on a firmer
foundation.</blockquote><p>
To this end, said Low, he and Eldon Hall, Oran W. Nicks, and John Disher
would try to establish ground rules for manned lunar landing missions,
to determine reasonable spacecraft weights, to specify launch vehicle
requirements, and to prepare an integrated development plan, including
the spacecraft, lunar landing and takeoff system, and launch vehicles.<a
href = "#source54">54</a><p>
The Space Task Group, although still having difficulties with Mercury
(in an attempted launch on 21 November, the first Mercury-Redstone had
risen only a few centimeters off its pad), also moved to support a
program that would be more than just a circumlunar flight. Gilruth had
reorganized his people in September, setting up an Apollo Projects
Office in Faget's Flight Systems Division. After getting the feasibility
study contracts started, Faget, Piland (head of the new office), and J.
Thomas Markley attended an Apollo-Saturn conference in Huntsville, at
which they reported progress on the contracts. Later that afternoon,
Faget and von Braun agreed to work together on a plan to place man
<cite>on</cite> the moon and not just in orbit around it.<a href =
"#source55">55</a><p>
Gilruth assigned Markley as liaison with Marshall. Spending most of his
time in Huntsville, Markley learned the opinions of many of von Braun's
group on future vehicles and mission approaches and became well versed
in their preference for rendezvous in earth orbit rather than direct
flight, which would require vehicles much bigger than Saturn as then
planned. In December, Markley reported to Donlan that Marshall was
studying orbital assembly and refueling techniques and was planning to
let contracts to industry for further studies on these subjects.<a href
= "#source56">56</a>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "explanation1">*</a> From Boeing; Convair/Avco;
Cornell/Bell/Raytheon; Douglas; General Electric/Bell; Goodyear;
Grumman/ITT; Guardite; Lockheed; McDonnell; Martin; North American;
Republic; and Vought.<p>
<a name = "explanation2">**</a> Panel members were Malcolm H. Hebb,
Lawrence A. Hyland, Donald P. Ling, Brockway McMillan, J. Martin
Schwarzschild, and Douglas R. Lord (technical assistant).
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "source42"><b>42</b>.</a> Disher to Admin., NASA, "Project
Apollo Feasibility Study Bidders' Briefing," 14 Sept. 1960, with
enc.; STG, "Summary of Statement of Work of Advanced Manned
Spacecraft and Systems," n.d.; Robert C. Seamans, Jr., memo,
"Debriefing of Unsuccessful Companies in Competitive R&D
Procurements," 27 Oct. 1960; Robert O. Piland to Assoc. Dir., STG,
"Visit of North American representatives to discuss North American
Aviation Apollo study proposal," 2 Nov. 1960; idem, "Apollo
activities," 9 Nov. 1960; idem, "Boeing representatives' visit
regarding Apollo proposal," 9 Nov. 1960; Robert G. Chilton to
Assoc. Dir., STG, "Visit of Hughes Representatives on November 8,
1960," 15 Nov. 1960.<p>
<a name = "source43"><b>43</b>.</a> Bailey memo to Procurement and Supply
Office Files, "Project Apollo Proposed Feasibility Study
Contracts," 30 Sept. 1960; STG, "Partial Set of Material for
Evaluation Board Use," n.d.; STG, "Plan for the Evaluation of
Contractors' Proposals for a Feasibility Study of an Advanced Manned
Spacecraft and System," 6 Oct. 1960; Bailey to Project Evaluation
Board, Attn.: Donlan, "Procurement Procedure," 12 Oct.
1960.<p>
<a name = "source44"><b>44</b>.</a> STG, minutes of meeting of Evaluation Board
for consideration of contractors' proposals for Apollo systems study,
18–19 Oct. 1960; STG, "Select Three Firms to Study Project
Apollo," news release, 25 Oct. 1960. In view of events a year
later, of special interest are R. H. Rice to STG, Attn.: Bailey,
"Proposal for Project Apollo, Request for Proposal No. 302,"
60LA 9327, 7 Oct. 1960, with enc.; and North American, "Feasibility
Study for Apollo Advanced Manned Spacecraft and System,"
NA-60-1247, 7 Oct. 1960.<p>
<a name = "source45"><b>45</b>.</a> STG, "Partial Set of Material for
Evaluation Board Use" and "Plan for Evaluation of
Proposals"; Johnson interview.<p>
<a name = "source46"><b>46</b>.</a> J. Thomas Markley, interview, Houston, 17
Jan. 1968.<p>
<a name = "source47"><b>47</b>.</a> Goett interview; Seamans, interview,
Washington, 26 May 1966; NASA Hq. TWX to field centers, 25 May 1961;
Gilruth to staff, "President's request for additional budget
action," 26 May 1961.<p>
<a name = "source48"><b>48</b>.</a> [Bruce T. Lundin et al.], "Report of
Special Working Group on Location of Manned Space Flight Activity,"
14 Oct. 1960.<p>
<a name = "source49"><b>49</b>.</a> Swenson, Grimwood, and Alexander,
<cite>This New Ocean</cite>, pp. 203-204, ch. 9.<p>
<a name = "source50"><b>50</b>.</a> Herbert G. Patterson, minutes of technical
negotiations meeting with General Electric, 27 Oct. 1960; John B. Lee,
minutes of meeting with Martin Company, 1 Nov. 1960; William W. Petynia,
minutes of meetings with Convair/Astronautics, 2 Nov. 1960.<p>
<a name = "source51"><b>51</b>.</a> George B. Kistiakowsky to Glennan, 28 Nov.
1960; Donald F. Hornig to Glennan, 28 Oct. 1960; Hornig et al.,
"Report of Ad Hoc Panel on Man-in-Space," 14 Nov. 1960.<p>
<a name = "source52"><b>52</b>.</a> Hornig et al., "Report of Ad Hoc
Panel," pp. 1, 7-8.<p>
<a name = "source53"><b>53</b>.</a> Rosholt, <cite>Administrative
History</cite>, pp. 152-53; Ad Hoc Saturn Study Committee,
"Presentation of Results of Saturn Study," 30 Sept. 1960, with
enc., Low, "Saturn Requirements for Project Apollo, Presentation to
Space Exploration Council, September 30, 1960," 29 Sept. 1960.<p>
<a name = "source54"><b>54</b>.</a> Low to Dir., Space Flight Prog.,
"Manned Lunar Landing Program," 17 Oct. 1960.<p>
<a name = "source55"><b>55</b>.</a> James M. Grimwood, <cite>Project Mercury: A
Chronology,</cite> NASA SP-4001 (Washington, 1963), pp. 117-18; Gilruth
to staff, "Change in organization of the Space Task Group," 1
Sept. 1960; Markley to all FSD groups, "Trip Report," 21 Nov.
1960; Markley to Assoc. Dir., STG, "Meeting between MSFC and STG on
mission for Saturn C-1 R and D Program and summary of MSFC trips by J.
T. Markley," 8 Dec. 1960.<p>
<a name = "source56"><b>56</b>.</a> Markley memo, 8 Dec. 1960.<p>
<P>
<HR>
<P>
<CENTER><A HREF="ch1-6.html">
<IMG SRC="previous.gif" ALIGN="left"
ALT="Previous Page">
</A>
<A HREF="ch1-8.html">
<IMG SRC="next.gif" ALIGN="right"
ALT="Next Page">
</A>
<A HREF="contents.html">
<IMG SRC="index.gif" ALIGN="middle"
ALT="Table of Contents"></A>
</CENTER><BR>
<HR>
<P>
</BODY>
<!--ADA TEAM 2001-->
</HTML>