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<!DOCTYPE HTML>
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<title>Chariots For Apollo, ch2-8</title>
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<p>
<h2>Choice of Facilities</h2>
<p>
While the launch vehicle was being debated by committee after committee,
Administrator Webb was making decisions on the numbers, kinds, and
locations of the special facilities and real estate needed to launch men
to the moon, Within five Months - from June to October 1961 - four new
installations, all in the Gulf Coast states, had been added to NASA's
far-flung domain.<a href = "#source51">51</a><p>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c054a.jpg" width=541 height=404 ALT="C-1 1st stage test firing"><p>
<cite>Booster stages for Redstone, Jupiter, and Saturn vehicles were
tested at Redstone Arsenal near Huntsville, Alabama. Above, in 1960,
Saturn C-1 first-stage engines are static-fired for the first
time.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
Although size of the launch vehicle for Apollo had still not been
decided, everybody agreed it would be big, too big for the launch pads
at the Cape. The first thing NASA needed was a more adequate spaceport.
To fabricate and assemble the lower stages of whatever rocket was
selected would require a huge manufacturing plant, preferably one
already in existence. The agency would need additional land, separate
from the spaceport but near the factory, to static-test the booster.
Safety and noise considerations demanded an immense area that could
contain not only the test stands but a buffer zone as well. And,
finally, if Gilruth's team was to manage all manned space flight
projects, as it had been assigned to do in January 1961, there would
have to be a site for spacecraft engineering and development
facilities.<p>
The monstrous size envisioned for the launch vehicle and the need for
these installations to be accessible to each other brought an additional
factor into play. Since the booster would have to be transported by
water, the agency would need ice-free waterways for year-round
operations. NASA planners looked, logically, at the Gulf Coast, which
had a temperate climate and an intercoastal waterway system. Two of the
five states, Florida and Alabama, already had Apollo-oriented centers,
which led to the reasoning that the new facilities should be situated
nearby.<a href = "#source52">52</a><p>
Kurt H. Debus, as leader of NASA's launch operations (first for Wernher
von Braun, then for all of the agency's flights from Cape Canaveral,
Florida), had long dreamed of building a spaceport. In July 1961, he and
Major General Leighton I. Davis, Commander of the Air Force Missile Test
Center at the Cape, endorsed a report on eight proposed sites. Led by
Major Rocco A. Petrone, Colonel Leonard Shapiro, and Colonel Asa B.
Gibbs, the Debus-Davis study group evaluated Cape Canaveral (offshore);
Cape Canaveral (onshore - Merritt Island); Mayaguana (in the Bahama
Islands); Cumberland Island (off the southeastern coast of Georgia);
Brownsville, Texas; Christmas Island; Hawaii; and White Sands, New
Mexico. Only White Sands and Merritt Island were economically
competitive, flexible, and safe enough to be considered further.<a href
= "#source53">53</a> On 24 August, NASA announced that it had chosen
Merritt Island and that it would buy 323 square kilometers of land for
the new NASA launch center.<p>
Debus had well-thought-out ideas for mobile launch operations
facilities: the big boosters would be assembled stacked vertically and
checked out under protective cover and then moved to the launch pad. He
drew up plans for personnel buildup, construction contracts, and
administrative autonomy. On 7 March 1962, when Marshall's Launch
Operations Directorate became NASA's Launch Operations Center, Debus was
ready. (After the assassination of the President in November 1963, the
new installation would be renamed the John F. Kennedy Space Center.)<a
href = "#source54">54</a> <p>
In Huntsville, von Braun viewed the facilities for an accelerated
booster development program in a different light. His 6,000 employees
were housed in part of the Army's Redstone Arsenal, on the Tennessee
River. Although it was adequate for engineering development and
static-testing of smaller rockets, the Marshall center could not handle
the immense vehicles planned for the lunar voyage. Von Braun would need
land and facilities elsewhere, but with access to the navigable waters
of the Tennessee Valley Authority. A survey of government-owned war
surplus plants revealed one near St. Louis and another (named Michoud)
near New Orleans that were suitable for building the huge boosters. But
the Mississippi River around St. Louis often froze over during the
winter months. So Michoud, with a mammoth building that contained 0.17
square kilometers under one roof as part of a 3.5-square-kilometer
complex along the water's edge, was selected on 7 September 1961.<a href
= "#explanation1">*</a> Designed as a shipyard, it had become a cargo
aircraft factory in 1943 and a tank engine plant during the Korean
conflict. Here the Chrysler Corporation and The Boeing Company would
construct the first stages of the Saturn C-1 and, later, of the C-3,
C-4, or C-5 (or whatever model was chosen).<a href =
"#source55">55</a><p>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c054c.jpg" width=589 height=374 ALT="The Michoud facility"><p>
<cite>To assemble the large Saturns, NASA needed a plant, preferably one
already built. The Michoud facility (above), close to New Orleans,
suited the requirements.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c054d.jpg" width=587 height=408 ALT="Saturn IBs inside Michoud"><p>
<cite>Inside Michoud in 1968 (above), Saturn IBs are on the assembly
line.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
Influencing the Michoud decision was the need for a test operations area
nearby where acoustics could be managed and controlled, as well as
logistics. Von Braun's team had always worried about the noise and
vibration generated during static-testing (and so had the citizens of
Huntsville). As boosters became larger, they became louder, and their
low-frequency resonances threatened all kinds of structural damage.
Using statistics gathered from Saturn C-1 decibel and vibration levels,
acoustics experts estimated that the advanced Saturn would require a
much larger buffer zone.<p>
Marshall occupied only about 65 square kilometers of the more than
161-square-kilometer Redstone Arsenal, and the Army needed the rest of
the land for its own rocket development and test programs. But even the
whole expanse would not have been large enough for the superbooster.
What NASA required was about 400 square kilometers. So large a purchase
could be touchy if not properly handled. NASA officials worked through
Congress, while site survey teams operated through the executive branch
and administrative channels on a gargantuan land deal not far from
Michoud. Lieutenant Colonel S. F. Berry, detailed to NASA's Office of
Launch Vehicle Programs from the Army Corps of Engineers, helped the
selection committee narrow the test site choices.<a href =
"#source56">56</a><p>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c054b.jpg" width=585 height=403 ALT="Mississippi test facility"><p>
<cite>When the Saturn booster grew in size, NASA obtained land in a less
populated area, in Mississippi on the Pearl River near the Gulf of
Mexico. In the 1968 photograph above, test stands appear beside the
waterways.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
On 25 October 1961, NASA announced that it would purchase outright 54
square kilometers in southwest Mississippi and obtain easement rights
over another 518 square kilometers in Mississippi and Louisiana for the
big booster static-test site. Simultaneously, the Justice Department
filed suits of condemnation, under the law of eminent domain, in the
United States District Courts in both states. The area, largely flat
pine forest, was on the Pearl River, only 56 kilometers northeast of
Michoud. Well suited to NASA's needs because of its deep-water access
and low-density population, the Pearl River site was bought for about
$18 million. While engineers at Marshall drew up specifications for
static-test stands, canals, and storage areas, nearly 100 families,
including the whole community of Gainsville, Mississippi, had to sell
out and relocate. There were few complaints, as most of the residents
were pleased at the prospect of new economic opportunities.<a href =
"#source57">57</a><p>
Meanwhile, Ralph E. Ulmer and Paul G. Dembling, facilities and legal
experts at NASA Headquarters, were saddled with most of the worries
connected with the whirlwind activities of site scouting and selection
for the manned space flight center. For example, Ames Research Center
Associate Director John F. Parsons, who led the search for the
spacecraft development center, reported to Dembling and Ulmer, and no
one else, on the whereabouts of his team and its need for advice and
support. Webb, Dryden, and Seamans referred all inquiries to Dembling,
in an effort to avoid undue pressures from persons and groups trying to
advance local prospects.<a href = "#source58">58</a><p>
On 13 and 14 September 1961, Webb and Dryden reviewed all the factors in
selecting the site for manned space flight activities and decided to
move that NASA function to Houston.<a href = "#explanation2">**</a> NASA
announced the decision on 19 September 1961. Gilruth and his Space Task
Group would soon have a home of their own to manage, a place in which to
develop the payloads for future rockets. Webb called it "the
command center for the manned lunar landing and follow-on manned space
flight missions," intimating that an integrated mission control
center would also be located in the Houston area.<p>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c055c.jpg" width=544 height=406 ALT="The new MSC"><p>
<cite>Above is a 1964 photograph of the new Manned Spacecraft Center at
Clear Lake near Houston.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
Most Space Task Group "Virginians" - both native and otherwise
- were not very happy over the prospect of a transfer to Texas. But
NASA's opportunity to accept a politically arranged gift of four square
kilometers of saltgrass pastureland was too good to refuse.<a href =
"#explanation3">***</a> Of course, there were the usual charges of undue
political influence, largely from the areas that had been turned down.
The fact that there were Texans in powerful political positions - Vice
President Johnson and Congressman Albert W. Thomas (chairman of the
House Independent Offices Appropriations Committee) - provided much of
the ammunition for a brief barrage of critical newsprint. (Later, when
NASA spent more than $1 million to acquire an additional two square
kilometers for better frontage, the accusations of "special
interests" were revived.) But the Houston area met all the technical
criteria for the new center. The seventh (soon to be sixth) largest city
in the country, Houston had the utilities, transportation, and weather,
as well as all the cultural, academic, industrial, and recreational
specifications.<a href = "#source59">59</a><p>
Webb knew that facilities and construction were critical to success in
landing on the moon during the 1960s. He called on the Army Corps of
Engineers for assistance, rather than face the costly and time-consuming
struggle of staffing a NASA office for this one-time task. The Corps
would be invaluable in acquiring land at both Merritt Island and Michoud
and in constructing new facilities at the Cape, at Michoud, and at
Houston. Webb asked Lieutenant General W. K. Wilson, Chief of Engineers,
to join him in this enterprise almost as a partner.<a href =
"#source60">60</a><p>
Although the acquisition of real estate had demanded his close
attention, the Administrator had never lost sight of the urgency of the
Apollo launch vehicle and lunar landing mode questions. These needed to
be resolved before the Corps of Engineers and NASA's facilities
engineers could do very much about designing the supporting
installations.<a href = "#source61">61</a>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "explanation1">*</a> Although the Saturn versus Nova debates
continued, the selection of Michoud ended all chances of clustering
eight F-1 engines in the first stage - unless the plant roof were
raised. The fact that only four or five barrels could be put together
did not worry Marshall, as this number would be more than enough to
support assembly in earth orbit, that center's favored mode. Proponents
of direct flight had essentially lost their vehicle; but they continued
to argue for another year, anyway.<p>
<a name = "explanation2">**</a> For details of procedures and the
criteria on which the decision was based, see Appendix A.<p>
<a name = "explanation3">***</a> Webb had written Gilruth in June 1961
that he seriously doubted NASA would be permitted to establish any large
activity including several thousand more people in the Virginia area.
Although no commitment had been made, Webb had learned from Congressman
Thomas that Rice University in Houston had set aside 15 square
kilometers of land for a research institution. Its location near the
Houston ship channel made it highly desirable for NASA. Earlier, Don
Ostrander had recommended to Seamans that the Space Task Group be moved
to and combined with Marshall in Huntsville.
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "source51"><b>51</b>.</a> Robert L. Rosholt, <cite>An Administrative
History of NASA, 1958–1963,</cite> NASA SP-4101 (Washington, 1966), pp.
198-239.<p>
<a name = "source52"><b>52</b>.</a> William E. Lilly, "Facilities in
Support of Manned Space Flight," in <cite>Proceedings of the Second
NASA-Industry Program Plans Conference, February 11–12, 1963,</cite>
NASA SP-29 (Washington, 1963), pp. 51-59.<p>
<a name = "source53"><b>53</b>.</a> The "Debus-Davis Study" was
officially titled "NASA-DOD Joint Report on Facilities and
Resources Required at Launch Site to Support NASA Manned Lunar Landing
Program," Phase I Rept., 31 July 1961.<p>
<a name = "source54"><b>54</b>.</a> Seamans TWX to all NASA field elements, 24
Aug. 1961; "Agreement between DOD and NASA Relating to the Launch
Site for the Manned Lunar Landing Program," signed by Webb and
Roswell Gilpatric on 24 Aug. 1961; Seamans to Lt. Gen. W. K. Wilson,
Jr., 21 Sept. 1961; Webb to Wilson, 22 Sept. 1961; Launch Operations
Directorate, "Study: Feasibility of Relocation from Cape Canaveral
to Merritt Island, NASA Launch Operations Directorate Industrial
Facilities and Apollo Spacecraft Mission Support Facilities,"
December 1961; Francis E. Jarrett, Jr., and Robert A. Lindemann,
"Historical Origins of the Launch Operations Center to July 1,
1962," draft ed., KSC Historical Monograph 1, December 1964;
[Gordon L. Harris], <cite>The Kennedy Space Center Story</cite> (Kennedy
Space Center, Fla., January 1969); Angela C. Gresser, "Historical
Aspects Concerning the Redesignation of Facilities at Cape
Canaveral," KSC Historical Note 1, April 1964.<p>
<a name = "source55"><b>55</b>.</a> Fleming notes, 31 July 1961; David S. Akens
et al., "History of the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center from
July 1 to December 31, 1961," 1, MSFC Historical Monograph 4, March
1962, pp. 37-41; "Michoud Assembly Facility," MSFC fact sheet,
20 July 1965; NASA, "NASA Selects New Orleans Plant for Space
Vehicle Assembly," news release 61-201, 7 Sept. 1961; William
Zigler, "History of NASA MTF and Michoud: The Fertile Southern
Crescent: Bayou Country and the American Race into Space," NASA
HHN-127, September 1972, pp. 15-16, 25.<p>
<a name = "source56"><b>56</b>.</a> Leo L. Jones, "A Brief History of
Mississippi Test Facility, 1961–1966," pp. 1-11; NASA, "NASA
Selects Launch Vehicle Test Site," news release 61-236, 25 Oct.
1961.<p>
<a name = "source57"><b>57</b>.</a> NASA, "NASA Selects Test Site";
Jones, "Brief History."<p>
<a name = "source58"><b>58</b>.</a> Silverstein to Admin., NASA, "proposed
site selection criteria and site survey team for the proposed manned
spacecraft center," n.d.; John F. Parsons et al., "Final
Report of the Site Survey Team for a Manned Space Flight
Laboratory," September 1961; Paul G. Dembling, interview,
Washington, 25 Sept. 1969; U.S. Army, "Army Engineers Award Contract
for Initial Construction of NASA Manned Spacecraft Center at
Houston," news release, 29 March 1962.<p>
<a name = "source59"><b>59</b>.</a> Webb, memo for the President, no. subj., 14
Sept. 1961; ibid., 14 Sept. 1961, with enc., "Site Selection
Criteria"; T. Keith Glennan to Rep. Albert W. Thomas,
"Construction of Laboratory near Houston, Texas," 3 Nov. 1958;
Ostrander to Seamans, "Reflections on the Present American Posture
in Space," 21 April 1961; Webb to the Vice President, no subj., 23
May 1961; Webb to Gilruth, 14 June 1961; Robert B. Memifield, "Men
and Spacecraft: A History of the Manned Spacecraft Center
(1958–1969)," draft, pp. III-22 to III-33; Stephen B. Oates,
"NASA's Manned Spacecraft Center at Houston, Texas,"
<cite>Southwestern Historical Quarterly</cite> 67, no. 3 (January 1964):
350-75; Gilruth to staff, "Location of new site for Space Task
Group," 19 Sept. 1961, with enc., "Manned Space Flight
Laboratory Location," draft news release 61-207; NASA, "Manned
Space Flight Laboratory Location Study Completed," news release
61-207, 19 Sept. 1961; Col. R. P. West to NASA Spacecraft Center, 5 Jan.
1962; Dryden and Seamans to Admin., NASA, "Requirement for a
1,600-acre Site for the Manned Spacecraft Center," 5 Feb. 1962; R.
A. Diaz to MSC, Attn.: Gilruth, "Acquisition of 600 acres of
additional land for the Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, Texas,"
16 Feb. 1962; Webb to George R. Brown, 23 Feb. 1962; John A. Johnson to
Chief of Engineers, Attn.: Frederick M. Figert, 23 Feb. 1962.<p>
<a name = "source60"><b>60</b>.</a> Webb to Wilson, 22 Sept. 1961.<p>
<a name = "source61"><b>61</b>.</a> See Webb's foreword in Rosholt,
<cite>Administrative History,</cite> pp. iii-vi.
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