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<!DOCTYPE HTML>
<HTML>
<HEAD>
<title>Chariots For Apollo, ch5-2</title>
<meta http-equiv=Content-Type content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
</head>
<BODY BGCOLOR="#FFFFFF">
<p>
<h2>The Headquarters Role</h2>
<p>
Shortly after Brainerd Holmes joined NASA Headquarters as its first
Director of Manned Space Flight, he and Administrator James Webb
contracted with General Electric for studies on reliability and quality
assurance, analysis and integration of the complete Apollo vehicle
(spacecraft and booster), and procurement and operation of ground
equipment to check out and certify the vehicles for flight. To fulfill
this task, General Electric engineers would have to immerse themselves
in the day-to-day activities of the space flight centers. No one in the
field complained about General Electric's role in the reliability,
quality assurance, and checkout functions, since the centers wanted all
the help they could get in these areas. But the suggestion that a
contractor should tell government employees how to put their vehicles
together (the integration clause of the contract) to fly a mission was
resisted. Edward S. Miller of General Electric said: "The
contractor role in Houston was not very firm. Frankly, they didn't want
us. There were two things against us down there. No. 1, it was a
Headquarters contract, and it was decreed that the Centers shall use GE
for certain things; and [No. 2] they considered us Headquarters
spies." For some time after the contract award, just exactly what
General Electric would do was not exactly clear.<a href =
"#source3"><b>3</b></a><p>
In February 1962, General Electric engineers began holding monthly
review meetings, but they met with little success in selling their plans
for spacecraft and launch vehicle integration. After several of these
gatherings, contractor officials complained in August that there was
"little understanding by NASA people as to the role of GE."
That same month, General Electric nevertheless transferred 15 of its
engineers to Houston. To get the contractor into Huntsville operations,
the manager of the Headquarters office for integration and checkout
accompanied several General Electric employees to Marshall to explain
"GE roles in [the] Apollo program" to the center and Saturn
contractor officials. Neither Boeing nor Chrysler wanted any
"unannounced visits" by General Electric engineers, especially
since the two principal Saturn contractors could not foresee any way in
which General Electric could be of assistance to them. Marshall and the
contractors were assured that all visits would be arranged in advance,<a
href = "#source4"><b>4</b></a><p>
General Electric's other major task, however - designing, setting up,
and operating ground equipment to check out the flight vehicles - was
accepted at the field centers. Manned Spacecraft and Launch Operations
Center representatives said they were satisfied with the contractor's
work in this area, and Marshall asked for more help. Even here, however,
there were some reservations about turning General Electric loose. The
Apollo manager in Houston, for example, warned the company, in capital
letters, to do nothing unless it had "A WORK ORDER APPROVED BY THE
APOLLO SPACECRAFT PROJECT OFFICE."<a href =
"#source5"><b>5</b></a><p>
Eventually, the General Electric contract called for almost a thousand
persons, more than half of them stationed at Daytona Beach, near the
Cape launch site, where they designed and assembled the ground checkout
equipment needed to test the space vehicles for flight safety. The
remainder went to the three NASA centers and to contractor plants,
helping to ensure the receipt of good-quality hardware and performing
specialized studies when they had a "work order."<a href =
"#source6"><b>6</b></a>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c120.jpg" width=586 height=418 ALT="ACE control room">
<p>
<cite>General Electric employees monitor activities of a spacecraft test
in the automatic-checkout-equipment spacecraft control room in
1965.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
Webb had set up the General Electric contract to provide NASA
Headquarters with the technical specialists to watch over and
participate in Apollo's far-flung development activities in both
government and contractor establishments. He also wanted a bevy of
engineering system specialists near at hand to assist Holmes in making
technical decisions. Webb asked Frederick R. Kappel, President of
American Telephone & Telegraph Company, to form a group to provide
this talent for Apollo. Bellcomm, Inc., the new AT&T division, began
operating alongside Holmes' NASA Headquarters manned space flight
engineers in March 1962. Holmes immediately directed the contractor
engineers to work with Joseph Shea, his Office o Systems chief, first on
the study of the mode issue and then on the defense of NASA's decision
to land on the moon via the lunar-rendezvous method.<p>
Once the route studies were completed, Shea decided that Bellcomm
engineers should dip into mission planning and produce some
"reference trajectories" - a careful analysis of everything
involved in flying the space vehicles from the earth to the moon and
back. But when he took his newly formed Apollo Trajectory Working Group
to a meeting in Texas, Shea met with resistance. John P. Mayer, speaking
for the mission planners in Houston, said that his group had been doing
this kind of work for the past two years. He told Shea bluntly that
interjecting Bellcomm into mission planning was just one more attempt on
the part of Headquarters to move into operational areas that properly
belonged to the centers. Shea explained that Bellcomm would be a
supporting group and would not try to second-guess the centers.<a href =
"#source7"><b>7</b></a><p>
But many in Houston looked on Bellcomm representatives who attended many
of the subsequent trajectory meetings as being, like General Electric,
"Headquarters spies." What continued to rankle Mayer and his
colleagues in trajectory analysis was that Bellcomm, not always on the
scene, simply could not keep up with the latest operations data, mission
rules, and guidelines. As a result, Bellcomm sometimes gave Headquarters
out-of-date information, and the field centers had to spend much-needed
time in correcting misconceptions. Nevertheless, Bellcomm, never
numbering more than 200 persons, did produce some useful evaluations on
almost every aspect of Apollo throughout the decade. These engineers
were among the first to push for the pinpoint lunar landings that were
so successfully carried out after the first landing mission.<a href =
"#source8"><b>8</b></a><p>
Along with the mounting strength in contractor personnel, the Manned
Space Flight Office in Washington (only a handful of people in Mercury's
early days) also increased in number. By February 1963, Holmes had a
400-man force, presided over by himself and his deputies, George Low and
Joseph Shea. Low managed space medicine, launch vehicles, and office
operations; Shea concentrated on engineering matters.<a href =
"#source9"><b>9</b></a><p>
Much of the energy of the Headquarters office and its contractors during
1963 was devoted to drafting an Apollo Systems Specification book. The
aim of this document was to lay out the objectives, to define the
technical approach for implementing these objectives, and to establish
performance requirements. The task was difficult because many systems,
especially those in the lunar module and the advanced command module,
simply had not been studied in enough detail for anyone to state
positively what was expected. Numerous pages were stamped
"TBD" - to be determined. But there was some clarification of
policy for Apollo. Up to this time, the main objective had been
expressed only as landing a man on the moon and returning him safely
before the end of the decade. The specification book intimated, for the
first time, that exploration of the moon would not be limited to a
single mission.<a href = "#source10"><b>10</b></a><p>
A number of interesting specifications in the manual - intended for use
as the Headquarters "bible" for all parties in the development
of Apollo - remained valid throughout the program. For example, all
parts of the spacecraft would be designed to minimize the fire hazards
inherent in the use of pure oxygen atmosphere that North American had
been directed to incorporate in the command module in August 1962. North
American was instructed to design the command module so a single crew
member could return the craft safely to earth from any point in the
mission. And the service module would provide all spacecraft propulsion
and reaction control needs (spacecraft attitude changes in pitch, roll,
and yaw) from lunar transfer until it was jettisoned just before the
spacecraft reentered the earth's atmosphere.<a href =
"#source11"><b>11</b></a><p>
Hand in hand with definition of the system specifications were the
systems review meetings sponsored by the Office of Manned Space Flight.
The meetings had a two-fold aim: to gather information for the
specifications book and to make sure that the centers coordinated all
activities in Apollo's complex development. At the first of these
meetings, Shea found a gap in this coordination. Marshall was having
trouble with F-1 engine combustion instability, yet an offer to help
from Lewis Research Center - NASA's leading propulsion organization -
had been ignored.<a href = "#source12"><b>12</b></a><p>
Other instances of this lack of cooperation may have occurred, but the
three manned space flight centers had moved closer together, partially
to defend the mode choice and partially to stave off the intrusion of
General Electric into vehicle integration. On top of that, each center
had a great many questions that needed to be answered by the other field
elements. And they were working together on policies and mission rules
that became the foundation for the lunar landing program. At a mission
planning panel meeting, some of these ground rules emerged: two crewmen
would land on the moon and one man would remain with the command module
in lunar orbit; the lunar lander could stay on the moon from 21 to 48
hours; launch from the earth would take place in daylight to simplify
recovery operations in the event of an abort; launch to the moon from
earth orbit would begin within 4½ hours because of the boil-off
characteristics of liquid hydrogen in the S-IVB stage; and the first
lunar mission would be only a loop around the moon and return, since too
little was known about the start and restart capabilities of the service
module engine.<a href = "#source13"><b>13</b></a><p>
Most of these committees - and there were many, many of them - took
turns meeting at Houston, Huntsville, and Canaveral. By May 1963, the
panels were so numerous that Holmes realized that something had to be
done to keep track of them. He told Shea to form a Panel Review Board<a
href = "#explanation1"><b>*</b></a> as one more Headquarters tool for
managing Apollo.<p>
Shea convened the first meeting of the board in August 1963 at the Cape,
and representatives of each panel summarized their past activities. The
next item on the agenda was a session on standardizing the Interface
Control Documents (discussed in the previous chapter) and the selection
of Marshall as the repository for this documentation, to make sure it
would be available for reference by the participating organizations.
These periodic board meetings, besides keeping the Office of Manned
Space Flight closer to the mainstream of center activities, gave the
specialists a chance to learn what their colleagues were doing and an
opportunity to oversee progress, costs, and schedules. Areas that might
delay Apollo were discovered more quickly and dealt with more rapidly.<a
href = "#source14"><b>14</b></a>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c124a.jpg" width=588 height=398 ALT="Apollo Tracking Network">
<p>
<cite>Apollo tracking network in 1966. Radar stations with large
antennas for continuous tracking and communications were at Goldstone,
California; Madrid, Spain; and Canberra, Australia.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
NASA Headquarters stepped in on occasion to arbitrate among the centers.
At one time, telecommunications threatened to become a formidable issue
in Apollo, with Houston, Goddard, and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory
vying for control of the tracking network. The earth-circling band of
stations - about a dozen and a half - used in Mercury were not equipped
for the deep space communications of Apollo, but by 1963 a capability
was developing in the unmanned spacecraft programs that promised to be
suitable. Jet Propulsion Laboratory intended to build two sets of
26-meter dish antennas, with two antennas at each of three sites -
Goldstone, California; near Canberra, Australia; and near Madrid, Spain
- that would provide continuous communications coverage of the moon. One
set would be equipped with the more advanced unified S-band system (a
system that tied the signals for tracking, telemetry, voice, television,
and command into a single radio carrier) for controlling, tracking, and
acquiring data from unmanned spacecraft, like Mariner and Surveyor, in
deep space. This system consolidated the functions of the many
transmitters and receivers characteristic of Mercury into one.
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c124c.gif" width=507 height=654 ALT="Earth-Moon communications">
<p>
<cite>Communications with the moon as the earth turned. Astronauts on
the moon's surface also could talk to one another.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
The Mercury tracking stations, with 9-meter dishes and the new S-band
radar, would communicate with the Apollo spacecraft in earth-orbital
flight. Once the vehicle had traveled 16,000 kilometers into space, the
26-meter antennas - spaced equidistantly at 120 degrees longitude around
the earth so one of the three always faced the moon - would take over.
Later, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory was to build a 64-meter antenna at
Goldstone (which then became the Goldstone Mars station) that gave
Apollo clearer communications, especially in television reception. The
laboratory wanted to construct two more of these stations, but the costs
were too great. The British government, however, had a radar station
with a 64-meter antenna at Sydney, Australia, that might be used.
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c124b.jpg" width=412 height=571 ALT="The Big Dish at Canberra">
<p>
<cite>The "big dish" at Canberra points toward space.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
Although some of the finer points on communications and control were
haggled over for the next 15 months, in March 1963 NASA Associate
Administrator Robert Seamans settled the basic issue of who was in
charge and when. He assigned Goddard as the technical operator of the
Manned Space Flight Network; during Apollo missions, the Manned
Spacecraft Center would assume operational control. The Jet Propulsion
Laboratory would be in charge of all unmanned mission communications,
turning its facilities over to the other centers during manned flights.
By the end of 1964, Headquarters had the communications and tracking
requirements and assignments for Apollo pretty well in hand.<a href =
"#source15"><b>15</b></a><p>
Other NASA Headquarters offices besides Manned Space Flight assumed lead
roles for Apollo - especially in the area of scientific interest.
Because of the complex engineering task, no one really expected that
science would do more than ride piggyback. Almost the only concern the
Houston center displayed was in the composition of the lunar surface
soil, which would affect the design of the landing gear. Director Robert
Gilruth sent a representative to a meeting of NASA's Space Science
Steering Committee to ask for help on the soil question and to remind
the members that whatever scientific equipment they might develop would
have to be adaptable to the lunar spacecraft.<a href =
"#source16"><b>16</b></a> But there was one area in which the scientists
could be of more immediate assistance. How to land Apollo on the moon
had been decided; how to get it there would be worked out by the
guidance experts. Where to land it and what the astronauts could do
after they got there was still unsettled.<p>
Shortly after President Kennedy had issued the lunar landing challenge,
Homer Newell of the Headquarters science office had asked Harold C. Urey
of the University of California at San Diego to suggest the best
scientific sites for lunar landings. Urey told Newell of five kinds of
lunar terrain of particular scientific interest:
<ol><li>High latitudes - to check for possible temperature
differences from equatorial areas. [Professor Harrison Brown had
theorized, Urey added, that water might exist beneath the surface
there.]<li>
Maria - to try to determine the depth of holes where great collisions
had taken place and, on a second landing, to discover the composition of
the material in such places as the Sea of Tranquillity.<li>
Inside a large crater - to look at an area, probably Alphonsus, where
observers had seen gases rising from the interior.<li>
Near a great rille, or "wrinkle," in a maria - to attempt to
find out what had caused it. [It had been suggested that water, rising
from the interior, had cracked the surface as it dried.]<li>
In a mountainous area - to observe crater walls.<a href =
"#source17"><b>17</b></a></ol><p>
In 1962, a two-month summer study conference in Iowa was cosponsored by
NASA and the National Academy of Sciences. The resulting deliberations,
published as <cite>A Review of Space Research,</cite> outlined the broad
objectives of a science program for Apollo. Conclusions were that the
most important scientific tasks foreseeable for manned lunar
explorations were educated observations of natural phenomena, the
collection of representative samples of surface materials, and the
installation on the moon of certain scientific monitoring
instruments.<p>
Late in 1963 and early in 1964, NASA Headquarters established science
planning teams to recommend investigations of the lunar surface, designs
for prototype long-life geophysical instruments, requirements for
astronaut training, the building of a receiving laboratory for handling
returned samples, and plans for the reduction and interpretation of
geological, geophysical, solar, selenological, astrophysical, and other
scientific data. Although the work of these teams was barely visible to
outside scientists, NASA had some of the best specialists in the country
helping to formulate its general objectives on the lunar science
program.<a href = "#source18"><b>18</b></a><p>
Five fundamental areas emerged as having the greatest potential:
<ol><li>Studies of the lunar lithosphere, the solid moon itself, its
chemical and physical constitution, and the implications this should
have for its origin in history.<li>
Investigations of the gravitational and magnetic fields and forces
around the moon, including experiments for the possible detection of
gravitational waves.<li>
Considerations of particles like solar protons and cosmic radiation,
together with their effect on the lunar gravitational field and
magnetosphere.<li>
Establishment of astronomical observatories on the moon.<li>
Studies of proto-organic matter, including the possibilities for
exobiology.<a href = "#source19"><b>19</b></a></ol><p>
Realistically, everyone realized that the first manned visit to the
lunar surface, limited to no more than 24 hours, would hardly satisfy
the desires of most scientists. With proper planning, however, a bonanza
of scientific results could be gleaned even from that first landing. In
June 1964, the mineralogy and petrology planning team underscored these
hopes by drawing an analogy between the lunar voyage and another
historic event:
<blockquote><p>Some time before the year 1492, a group of workmen were
standing in a shipyard looking at a half-constructed craft. One of them
said "It won't float"; another said "If the sea monsters
don't get it first, it will fall off the edge"; a third, more
reflective than the others, said "What do they want to go for,
anyway?"<p>
The Apollo Project is primarily a glorious adventure, in which man will
for the first time tread upon the surface of another celestial body. It
will be a magnificent feat, and a milestone in the history of the human
race. No other purpose or justification is necessary.<p>
Important scientific knowledge will result from the landing. First among
the scientific objectives of the Apollo mission will be the return of
samples of the lunar surface materials. The study of such samples will
tell us of the thermodynamic conditions under which they were formed;
whether the moon is a differentiated body or not; and perhaps whether it
was captured by the Earth or was formed from it in the distant past.<a
href = "#source20"><b>20</b></a></blockquote><p>
Most of the work of NASA Headquarters on behalf of the scientific aims
of Apollo by the end of 1964 had little impact on the organizations and
contractors developing the program. All that the builders needed to know
was how much space to allow - and this would be minimal - and a general
idea of the future plans. When the time came to fly the missions,
however, the planners, astronauts, and flight preparations technicians
would have to pay more attention. The outline of what Apollo could
contribute to science had been sketched; the details would be filled in
later.<p>
Perhaps the Headquarters action that had the most significant effect on
Apollo was a change of leadership in the Office of Manned Space Flight.
When NASA had signed Grumman in 1962 to develop the lunar module, Holmes
had wanted the agency to ask for a supplemental appropriation for Gemini
and Apollo costs (see <a href = "ch4-5.html">Chapter 4</a>), but NASA's
top administrators - Webb, Dryden, and Seamans - had refused. Webb also
refused to transfer funds from other programs to manned space flight.
Holmes and Webb had different views of management methods and of the
priority of the manned program versus the rest of the space effort. The
Administrator feared an all-out effort to land a man on the moon - one
that subordinated all else - would endanger NASA's balanced program of
seeking U.S. preeminence in space science and technology. The Manned
Space Flight Director felt he had an overriding mandate from the
President to win a race to the moon. The question of funds and
priorities was taken to the White House. When President Kennedy cited
the importance of the lunar landing, Webb agreed that it was important
but said that he would not take responsibility for a program that was
not properly balanced. Kennedy accepted his position.<p>
Then in the first half of 1963 came the realization that Project Gemini
was suffering from more technical troubles than had been anticipated,
which would push the costs of that program past the billion mark, almost
double the original estimates. Gemini schedule stretchouts followed.
Holmes testified in March congressional authorization hearings that the
administration refusal to ask for a supplemental appropriation had
delayed the Gemini and Apollo programs four or five months. In the
renewal of Holmes-Webb differences over priorities, the President again
backed his space program administrator. Shortly thereafter, NASA
announced that Holmes was returning to industry.<a href =
"#source21"><b>21</b></a><p>
Moving to concentrate his resources on resolving Gemini and Apollo
problems, Administrator Webb had decided to conclude the Mercury program
after the ninth mission and to realign NASA organization throughout
Headquarters and the responsive field center elements. One of the first
requirements was to find a new leader for manned space flight. After
considering several candidates, Webb asked Ruben F. Mettler, President
of Space Technology Laboratories, Inc., to take the job. Mettler refused
but recommended George E. Mueller (pronounced "Miller"), his
Vice President for Research and Development. Webb accepted the
recommendation, and Mueller became NASA's Associate Administrator for
Manned Space Flight. With a doctorate in physics (Ohio State, 1951) and
23 years academic and industrial experience, Mueller had made many
contributions to the country's missile and spacecraft programs.<p>
Mueller had worked on Air Force manned space flight studies as early as
1958; later his laboratory had provided NASA with data that helped in
making the Apollo mode decision. Furthermore, Mueller was familiar with
NASA's relations with industry, both at Headquarters and the field
centers, and had studied ground support equipment problems and tracking
network issues as a system analysis contractor. But most useful to NASA
was his recent work with the Air Force on performance, schedule, and
budget constraints for the Minuteman missile. Derivatives of this
background - program control offices, schedules and resources planning,
and the subsystem manager technique - were to be incorporated into
Apollo to strengthen Headquarters and field center control over cost,
configuration, and schedules.<a href = "#source22"><b>22</b></a><p>
Soon after joining NASA, Mueller asked Air Force Brigadier General
Samuel C. Phillips to help him apply to Apollo the kind of configuration
and logistics management procedures established for Minuteman. Phillips
brought with him about 20 officers to fill key positions. Mueller
realized that this sudden infusion of Headquarters-level personnel might
be detrimental to relations between his office and the field activities.
To forestall any resentment, he invited center directors Gilruth,
Wernher von Braun, and Kurt Debus to be his houseguests, to get to know
them informally and to discuss with them his plans for Apollo. Mueller
then visited Huntsville, Houston, and Canaveral. After completing the
circuit, he began pressuring the field elements to conform to a
long-range plan of program management.<a href =
"#source23"><b>23</b></a><p>
In his attempts to inaugurate effective Headquarters control of Apollo,
Mueller still faced vestiges of field center autonomy. The intercenter
groups had gone far in working out system specifications and planning
for vehicle integration; in Mueller's view, however, they had not gone
far enough. To get to the moon by the set time, he told von Braun,
Gilruth, and Debus, Headquarters would have to be the final authority in
administering a unified and coordinated plan of program control.<a href
= "#source24"><b>24</b></a><p>
Mueller decided to make some changes in one management tool instituted
by Holmes in late 1961. In a meeting of the Manned Space Flight
Management Council<a href = "#explanation2"><b>**</b></a>
on 24 September 1963, Mueller said
that too many persons were on the council and that it would henceforth
be composed only of himself, von Braun, Gilruth, and Debus. This new,
slimmed-down body would act as a board of directors in making decisions
and managing Apollo and would expect to be frequently and thoroughly
briefed on all Apollo matters, down to the nuts and bolts, by top
technical managers. To make sure that the industrial leaders in the
program were kept abreast of progress and problems, Mueller also
intended to form an Apollo Executives Committee, of company presidents,
which would tour the appropriate NASA facilities and then hold periodic
reviews thereafter. These men, Mueller knew, could put pressure on their
people to solve any development problems.<a href =
"#source25"><b>25</b></a><p>
Webb, Dryden, and Seamans recognized in mid-1963 that NASA (and Apollo)
had grown too large for Seamans to continue as "operating vice
president," which he had been since 1961. They decided to give
Seamans three "Associate Administrators" for specific
activities: Mueller would manage the Office of Manned Space Flight and
the three centers working on manned missions - Huntsville, Houston, and
Canaveral. Homer Newell and Raymond L. Bisplinghoff would hold similar
positions for the Office of Space Science and Applications and the
Office of Advanced Research and Technology. Mueller revamped his own
office, dividing it into five suboffices (the five-box system) - (1)
program control, (2) systems engineering, (3) test, (4) flight
operations, and (5) reliability and quality - for each major program,
Apollo and Gemini, reporting to a program director who would in turn
answer to Mueller. Mueller kept the job of acting Apollo manager for
himself and gave Gemini responsibility to Low. The manned spacecraft
centers were directed to organize their program offices accordingly.<a
href = "#source26"><b>26</b></a><p>
While the reorganization was going on, Mueller asked two veterans in his
office, John Disher and Adelbert Tischler, for a study of Apollo's
chances of landing on the moon by 1970. From the information they
gathered on the existing technical problems, Disher and Tischler
concluded that prospects were one in ten. After reading this pessimistic
report, Mueller knew the adverse schedule trend would have to be
reversed. When MSC Director Gilruth sent a representative to
Headquarters in late September to find out if the four manned Saturn I
flights Washington had planned could be reduced to three, Mueller saw an
opportunity to begin tightening the schedules. He reviewed a Bellcomm
study that recommended terminating the Saturn I launch vehicle program
after the tenth flight, which Marshall estimated would save $280
million, and concluded that there was no reason to fly any manned Saturn
I vehicles. Ironically, NASA had just selected 14 new pilots, bringing
corps strength to 30.<a href = "#explanation3"><b>***</b></a>
Administrator Webb worried briefly that the astronauts might not get
enough space flight experience with the cutback, but Mueller reminded
him that Gemini would fill that gap. Mueller added that there was a much
better chance of beating the deadline if NASA had to man-rate only two
boosters, the Saturn IB and V, instead of three.<a href =
"#source27"><b>27</b></a><p>
Hard on the heels of the Saturn I decision came another pronouncement
that was just as startling - if not more so - to the field centers. At a
late October meeting of the Management Council, Mueller told Debus, von
Braun, and Gilruth that "we can now drop this step-by-step
procedure" of flight-testing. All parts of the spacecraft and
launch vehicle would be developed and thoroughly tested at manufacturing
plants and test sites before being delivered to the Cape as ready-to-fly
hardware. There would no longer be any need for piece-by-piece,
stage-by-stage qualification flights of the vehicles. Each launch was to
be prepared as though it were the ultimate mission, to avoid dead-end
testing, with its narrow objectives and hardware components not intended
for the lunar missions.<a href = "#source28"><b>28</b></a><p>
Although the chances for getting to the moon within the allotted time
may have improved, Apollo now had more launch vehicles and pads than
were needed to do the job. When contracts were awarded, from late 1961
through 1962, step-by-step testing had been the norm. Hardware was
purchased and facilities were built to carry out this time-tested
practice. Mueller's all-up decision changed the rules, limited the
number of Saturn I launches, and made it likely that not all of the
Saturn IBs contracted for would be flown in mainline Apollo. These
results raise an interesting, though moot, question. If this decision
had been made before the contracts were awarded, would there have been
both a Saturn I and a IB? An earth-orbital and lunar-orbital version of
the command module? Later, NASA had to find some useful employment for
the excess vehicles, eventually assigning them to the Skylab and
Apollo-Soyuz programs. But this did not worry Mueller in late 1963. His
job was to figure out how to get men on the moon within the time set by
President Kennedy.
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c131.jpg" width=582 height=416 ALT="Mueller briefs Kennedy">
<p>
<cite>On 16 November 1963 in Cape Canaveral's Blockhouse 37, NASA's new
manned space flight chief George Mueller briefed left to right, front
row (seated) George Low, Kurt Debus, Robert Seamans, James Webb,
President John Kennedy, Hugh Dryden, Wernher von Braun, Gen. Leighton I.
Davis, and Senator George Smathers on Apollo program plans. The models
on the table - Vehicle Assembly Building, Saturn V launch vehicle on
crawler, and mobile service tower - represented key elements in the
Apollo mission.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
Shortly after Headquarters reorganized for improved management of Apollo
and Mueller made his changes to enhance the chances for meeting
schedules, the whole nation was wracked by a series of traumatic events.
President Kennedy was assassinated, and his alleged killer was murdered
while the country watched. No one who had access to a television set can
ever forget those days. In the soul-searching that followed, national
goals and social priorities were questioned. Periodicals such as Science
were soon attacking what they called NASA's misplaced priorities, and
books like <cite>The Moon-Doggle</cite> were expressing disillusionment
with Apollo.<a href = "#source29"><b>29</b></a><p>
Although caught up in the grief of the times, the Apollo worker -
manager, engineer, technician - had been and still was deluged by the
complex tasks inherent in developing and qualifying the vehicles.
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "explanation1"><b>*</b></a> Board membership consisted of:
from the Headquarters Office of Manned Space Flight (OMSF), Deputy
Director, Systems, and Deputy Director, Programs; from Marshall (MSFC),
Deputy Director, Research and Development, and two Associate Directors;
from the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), Deputy Director, Development
and Programs, and Deputy Director, Mission Requirements and Flight
Operations; and from the Launch Operations Center (LOC), Assistant
Director, Plans and Project Management. The authorized panels and their
cochairmen were: Crew Safety, Joachim P. Kuettner (MSFC) and Alfred D.
Maniel (MSC); Electrical Systems Integration, Hans J. Fichtner (MSFC)
and Milton G. Kingsley (MSC); Flight Mechanics, Rudolf F. Hoelker (MSFC)
and Calvin H. Perrine (MSC); Launch Operations, Rocco A. Petrone (LOC)
and Walter C. Williams (MSC); Mechanical Design Integration, Hans R.
Palaoro (MSFC) and Lyle M. Jenkins (MSC); Mission Control Operations,
Fridtjof A. Speer (MSFC) and John D. Hodge (MSC); and Onboard
Instrumentation, Otto A. Hoberg (MSFC) and Alfred B. Eickmeier (MSC).<p>
<a name = "explanation2"><b>**</b></a> The council, established on 21
December 1961, originally consisted of Holmes, his directors in OMSF
(Charles H. Roadman, Aerospace Medicine; Milton W. Rosen, Launch
Vehicles and Propulsion; and William E. Lilly, Program Review and
Resources Management), and his deputies (Shea, Systems Engineering, and
Low, Spacecraft and Flight Missions); Wernher von Braun, Director, and
Eberhard F. M. Rees, Deputy Director (MSFC); and Gilruth, Director, and
Walter C. Williams, Associate Director (MSC). By 27 February 1962, James
E. Sloan, Holmes' Director of Integration and Checkout, and Kurt Debus,
Director, LOC, had been added. On 26 and 27 February 1963, three new
names appeared on the council rolls; James C. Elms, Deputy Director,
Development and Programs (MSC); Albert F. Siepert, Deputy Director
(LOC); and Robert F. Freitag, Director, Launch Vehicles and Propulsion
(OMSF - replacing Rosen). During 1963, George M. Knauf took over from
Roadman as Director of Aerospace Medicine.<p>
<a name = "explanation3"><b>***</b></a> The astronauts in the third
group (announced 18 October 1963) were Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr., William A.
Antlers, Charles A. Bassett II, Alan L. Bean, Eugene A. Cernan, Roger B.
Chaffee, Michael Collins, R. Walter Cunningham, Donn F. Eisele, Theodore
C. Freeman, Richard F. Gordon, Jr., Russell L. Schweickart, David R.
Scott, and Clifton C. Williams, Jr. As in the second group, only two
(Cunningham and Schweickart) were not members of the military
services.<p>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "source3"><b>3</b>.</a> MSC, "Manned Spacecraft Center,
Atlantic Missile Range Operations: Facilities, 1959–1964," 15 April
1963; NASA, <cite>Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1963,</cite> pp. 195-96;
Barton C. Hacker and James M. Grimwood, <cite>On the Shoulders of
Titans: A History of Project Gemini,</cite> NASA SP-4203 (Washington,
1977), chap. 6 through 9; House Committee on Science and Astronautics,
<cite>Astronautical and Aeronautical Events of 1962: Report,</cite> 88th
Cong., 1st sess., 12 June 1963, p. 15; James E. Webb, "Statement of
the Administrator, [NASA], Regarding Selection of a Contractor for
Overall Checkout of the Project Apollo Space Vehicle," 12 March
1962; House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on
Manned Space Flight, <cite> 1964 NASA Authorization: Hearings on H.R.
5466 (Superseded by H.R. 7500),</cite> 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963, pp.
1099, 1101, 1103-04; John H. Disher, interview, Washington, 26 Jan.
1967; Ladislaus W. Warzecha, interview, Houston, 14 Jan. 1970; Webb to
D. Brainerd Holmes, no subj., 5 Jan. 1962; NASA, "Procurement Plan
for Project Apollo Space Vehicle Integration Analysis, Reliability
Assessment and Checkout," February 1962; Charles W. Frick to Robert
O. Piland, "Comments on Agenda Items for the Management Council
Meeting," 23 March 1962; Dave W. Lang to Wesley L. Hjornevik et
al., "Contract clause," 9 April 1962; Webb,
"Determination and Findings: Authority to Negotiate Class of
Contracts," 25 July 1962; Edward S. Miller, interview, Valley
Forge, Pa., 18 Feb. 1970.<p>
<a name = "source4"><b>4</b>.</a> Percy F. Hurt to Dep. Proj. Mgr.,
ASPO, "Trip Report of Percy Hurt to Syracuse, New York, to Attend
GE Progress Review Meeting, on August 14, 1962," 16 Aug. 1962; H.
L. Schimmack to Paul F. Weyers, 24 Aug. 1962, with enc.,
"Integration Assignment Activity: 4 August–22 August 1962";
Charles Appelman, telephone interview, 18 April 1972; James E. Sloan
memo, "Introductory meetings with MSFC contractors to discuss G.E.
roles in Apollo program (Boeing and Chrysler) held on October 2,
1962," 4 Oct. 1962, with encs.; Henry P. Yschek to North American,
Attn.: H. H. Cutler, "Letter Contract NAS 9-150, Right of Access of
Apollo Integration Contractors," 10 April 1962.<p>
<a name = "source5"><b>5</b>.</a> Minutes of the third meeting of the
Systems Checkout Design Review Board, 1 Nov. 1962, p. 2; Frick to NASA
Hq., Attn.: Sloan, "Transmittal of General Electric Work Statement
and Manpower Requirements for FY-63," 3 Dec. 1962, with enc.
(emphasis in original).<p>
<a name = "source6"><b>6</b>.</a> William Collins, Jr., to Walter L.
Lingle, "Discussion of language changes under the General Electric
contract at a meeting in Mr. Holmes's office on Friday, June 28,
1963," 1 July 1963; George E. Mueller to MSC, MSFC, and LOC, Attn.:
Dirs., "Realignment of General Electric Company Contract," 30
Sept. 1963; Stanley M. Smolensky, minutes of OMSF Staff Meeting, 11 Jan.
1963; Melvin E. Dell to Yschek, "NAA contractual change to
establish the Apollo Support Department of the General Electric Company
as an associate contractor for NAA," 30 Dec. 1963; J. Thomas
Markley to Mgr., ASPO, "Present use of GE," 20 Jan. 1964;
General Electric Support Dept., "Apollo Support Program, Monthly
Progress Report: March 1963," Daytona Beach, Fla., 10 April 1963
(cf., e.g., idem, "ACE-S/C Reliability Quarterly Status Report,
Third Quarter 1965," 15 Oct. 1965).<p>
<a name = "source7"><b>7</b>.</a> House Committee on Science and
Astronautics, Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight, <cite>1964 NASA
Authorization Hearings,</cite> pp. 372-73, 1076, 1091, 1098-1101; Paul
E. Purser memo, "Operations of OMSF Office of Systems and
Bellcomm," 14 Jan. 1963, with encs.; minutes of Apollo Reference
Trajectory Working Group Meeting No. 1, 3 Jan. 1963; John P. Mayer to
Dir., MSC, "First meeting of Apollo Trajectory Working Group,
January 3, 1963," 7 Jan. 1963, with encs.<p>
<a name = "source8"><b>8</b>.</a> Joseph F. Shea to Julian M. Wrest, 7
Nov. 1963; Shea to Brig. Gen. Samuel C. Phillips, 25 Nov. 1964; Purser
memo, 14 Jan. 1963; Jay Holmes, minutes of OMSF Staff Meeting, 22 Nov.
1963; Carl R. Huss to JSC History Office, "Comments on Draft Copy
of 'Chariots for Apollo: A History of Lunar Spacecraft,'" 2 Nov.
1976.<p>
<a name = "source9"><b>9</b>.</a> NASA, "Holmes Names Two
Deputies," news release 63-32, 20 Feb. 1963; George M. Low,
interview, Houston, 7 Feb. 1967.<p>
<a name = "source10"><b>10</b>.</a> NASA, "Apollo System
Specification," OMSF directive M-D M 8000.001, 2 May 1963, pp. 1-1,
1-2, 2-1, 2-2.<p>
<a name = "source11"><b>11</b>.</a> Ibid., pp. 4.3-1, 4.3-2; letter,
Carl D. Sword to North American, "Contract Change Authorization No.
1," 28 Aug. 1962.<p>
<a name = "source12"><b>12</b>.</a> Low to Robert R. Gilruth, 26 Dec.
1962, with enc.; Smolensky, OMSF Staff Meeting, 11 Jan. 1963; D. B.
Holmes to Wernher von Braun, "Combustion Instability of F-1
Engine," 26 Jan. 1963; von Braun to D. B. Holmes, 11 March 1963.<p>
<a name = "source13"><b>13</b>.</a> MSC-ASPO, "Consolidated Meeting
Plan, Initial Issue," 18 Feb. 1962; Walter C. Williams to MSFC,
Attn.: von Braun, "Flight Control Operations and Ground Support
Requirements for Project Apollo," 1 March 1963; Williams to von
Braun, 7 March 1963; "Mission Control Operations Panel
(MCOP)," n.d. (probably August 1963); Robert V. Battey, minutes of
Apollo Mission Planning Panel organization meeting, 27 Feb. 1963; Mayer
memo, "Charter for Apollo Spacecraft Mission Trajectory
Sub-Panel," 26 March 1963; abstract of Apollo Mission Planning
Meeting No. 1, 27 March 1963; R. A. Newlander to Actg. Mgr., RASPO/LEM,
"Trip report of R. A. Newlander to MSC on March 27 & 28, 1963
to attend Mission Planning Panel and Trajectory Sub-Panel
Meetings," 1 April 1963; Battey to Action Committee, "Errata
to Abstract of Mission Planning Panel Meeting No. 1," 1 April 1963;
Mayer memo, "Preliminary Mission Rules for Use in Apollo Mission
Trajectory Calculations," 30 April 1963, with encs.; W. Schoen and
G. Scheuerlein to Joseph G. Gavin, Jr., et al., "Meeting of
Spacecraft Operations Analysis Working Group at MSC, Houston on May 1,
1963," 7 April [sic] 1963.<p>
<a name = "source14"><b>14</b>.</a> D. B. Holmes to MSC, MSFC, and LOC,
for Gilruth, von Braun, and Kurt H. Debus, "Establishment of a
Panel Review Board," 10 July 1963, with enc., Holmes memo,
"Panel Review Board," 10 July 1963; agenda, Panel Review Board
Meeting 63-1, 9–10 Aug. 1963, with encs.; minutes of Panel Review Board
Meeting 63-1, LOC, 9–10 Aug. 1963; agenda, Panel Review Board Meeting
63-2, 25 Sept. 1963, with encs.<p>
<a name = "source15"><b>15</b>.</a> N. A. Renzetti, ed., <cite>A History
of the Deep Space Network, 1, From Inception to January 1, 1969,</cite>
JPL technical report 32-1533 (Los Angeles, 1 Sept. 1971), pp. 13-16, 25;
Renzetti, telephone interview, 13 June 1972; Gerald M. Truszynski memo
for file, "Meeting at MSC on Location of European DSIF
Station," 3 Dec. 1962; Goddard Space Flight Center, "A Ground
Instrumentation Support Plan for the Near-Earth Phases of Apollo
Missions," GSFC X-520-62-211, 23 Nov. 1962; Corliss,
<cite>Histories of STADAN, MSFN, and NASCOM,</cite> pp. 149, 162-259;
Robert C. Seamans, Jr., to William H. Pickering and Harry J. Goett, 11
March 1964, with enc., "Management Plan for the Manned Space Flight
Network," 5 Feb. 1963; Seamans memo, subj., as above, 11 March
1963, with enc.; Dennis E. Fielder to Chief, Flight Operations Div.
(FOD), "Network management and control for manned space
flight," 30 Oct. 1963; Henry E. Clements to Chief, FOD,
"GSFC's presentation on network control," 31 Oct. 1963;
Gilruth to GSFC, Attn.: Goett, "Computation and Data Flow
Integrated Subsystem Testing Interface," 28 May 1964, with enc.,
"Computation and Data Flow Integrated Subsystem (CADFISS) Testing
Interface between GSFC and MSC for the Gemini and Apollo Programs,"
n.d.; Mueller and Edmond C. Buckley to KSC, MSC, MSFC, and GSFC, Attn.:
Dirs., "Assurance of Compatibility between Apollo Spacecraft,
Launch Vehicle and the supporting Tracking and Data Acquisition
Network," 30 July 1964; Buckley to Dep. Assoc. Admin., NASA,
"Division of Responsibility between GSFC and MSC on Computation for
the Manned Space Flight Network," 2 Oct. 1964, with enc.; Bernard
Lovell, <cite>The Story of Jodrell Bank</cite> (New York: Harper and
Row, 1968).<p>
<a name = "source16"><b>16</b>.</a> Robcrt O. Piland to Dir., MSC,
"Space Task Group representation on Lunar Sciences Subcommittee of
the NASA Space Sciences Steering Committee," 7 July 1961; Gilruth
to NASA Hq., Attn.: Low, "Designation of liaison member for the
Lunar Sciences Subcommittee of the Space Sciences Steering
Committee," 11 July 1961.<p>
<a name = "source17"><b>17</b>.</a> Harold C. Urey to Homer E. Newell,
19 June 1961.<p>
<a name = "source18"><b>18</b>.</a> Leonard D. Jaffe, secretary, minutes
of Ad Hoc Working Group on Apollo Scientific Experiments and Training,
27 March 1962; Vern C. Fryklund. Jr., to MSC, Attn.: Gilruth,
"Scientific Guidelines for the Apollo Project," 8 Oct. 1963;
National Academy of Sciences, <cite>A Review of Space Research,</cite>
NAS-NRC 1079 (Washington, 1962), report of summer study under auspices
of NAS at State Univ. of Iowa, 17 June–10 Aug. 1962; Edward M. Davin.
ed., "Apollo Lunar Science Program: Report of Planning Teams,"
pt. 1, "Summary," December 1964.<p>
<a name = "source19"><b>19</b>.</a> Shea memo for record, no subj., 26
March 1962; Fryklund letter, 8 Oct. 1963; Willis B. Foster to Dir.,
Program Review and Resources Management, "Submission for 1964
President's Annual Report," 30 Oct. 1964; Davin, ed.,
"Planning Teams Report," pp. 4-5.<p>
<a name = "source20"><b>20</b>.</a> Eugene N. Cameron et al.,
introduction to "Preliminary Report on the Sampling and Examination
of Lunar Surface Materials," 22 June 1964, in Appendix to Davin,
ed. "Planning Teams Report."<p>
<a name = "source21"><b>21</b>.</a> NASA, "Preliminary History of
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration during the
Administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson, November 1963–January
1969," final ed., 15 Jan. 1969, pp. I-49 through I-52; D. Brainerd
Holmes, interview by Don Neff, Time, Inc., 18 Jan. 1969; House Committee
on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight,
<cite>1964 NASA Authorization: Hearings on H.R. 5466,</cite> 88th Cong.,
1st sess., no. 3, pt. 2(a), 1963 (March 7), pp. 242-243; Robert Sherrod
notes on interview of David Williamson, Asst. Assoc. Admin., NASA, 10
April 1972; Hacker and Grimwood, <cite>On the Shoulders of
Titans,</cite> p. 128; NASA, "Holmes Returns to Industry as Mercury
Concludes," news release 63-133, 12 June 1963; Richard A. Smith,
"Now It's an Agonizing Reappraisal of the Moon Race,"
<cite>Fortune,</cite> November 1963, pp. 128, 268; John W. Finney,
"NASA Loses Chief of Moon Project," <cite>New York
Times,</cite> 13 June 1963, pp. 1-2.<p>
<a name = "source22"><b>22</b>.</a> Senate Committee on Aeronautical and
Space Sciences, <cite>NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1964: Hearings
on S. 1245,</cite> 88th Cong., 1st sess., pt. 2, pp. 774-75; Saul
Ferdman to Grimwood, 15 Nov. 1976; Joseph L. Myler, UPI, "Mueller
to Head Program to Land Men on Moon," Washington Post, 24 July
1963; Mueller interview, Washington, 27 June 1967; NASA, "George E.
Mueller," biographical data, 8 Jan. 1964; Senate Committee on
Aeronautical and Space Sciences, <cite>NASA Authorization for Fiscal
Year 1965: Hearings on S. 2446,</cite> 88th Cong., 2nd sess., 1964, pp.
467-68.<p>
<a name = "source23"><b>23</b>.</a> Jay Holmes, minutes of OMSF Staff
Meeting, 27 Dec. 1963; NASA, "NASA Appoints General Phillips to
Assist in Apollo Program Management," news release 63-287, 31 Dec.
1963; Mueller interview.<p>
<a name = "source24"><b>24</b>.</a> Mueller interview.<p>
<a name = "source25"><b>25</b>.</a> Clyde B. Bothmer, minutes of Manned
Space Flight Management Council (MSFMC) meetings, 24 Sept. and 29 Oct.
1963.<p>
<a name = "source26"><b>26</b>.</a> Robert L. Rosholt, <cite>An
Administrative History of NASA, 1958–1963,</cite> NASA SP-4101
(Washington, 1966), pp. 281-302; NASA, "NASA Realigns Office of
Manned Space Flight," news release 63-241, 28 Oct. 1963; Jay
Holmes, minutes of Special OMSF Staff Meeting, 24 Oct. 1963, with enc.,
"Reorganization of the Office of Manned Space Flight," 24 Oct.
1963; Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, <cite>NASA
Authorization for 1965,</cite> pp. 471-73.<p>
<a name = "source27"><b>27</b>.</a> Disher and Adelbert O. Tischler,
presentation to Mueller, 28 Sept. 1963; Disher interview; Tischler,
interview, Washington, 7 July 1972; "Apollo Flight Mission
Assignments," OMSF program directive M-D E 8000.005A, 9 April 1963;
Alfred D. Mardel and Rob R. Tillett to Piland, "Trip Report to
Washington, D.C.," 30 Sept. and 3 Oct. 1963; Mueller to Robert F.
Freitag, "Replacement of Scheduled Manned Flights on Saturn
I," 18 Oct. 1963; Mueller to Webb, "Reorientation of Apollo
Plans," 26 Oct. 1963, annotated, "Approved during telephone
discussion with Dr. Mueller on Oct. 28, 1963 and later reviewed via
telephone with Dr. Seamans," signed by Webb; NASA, "NASA
Announces Changes in Saturn Missions," news release 63-246, 30 Oct.
1963; David M. Hammock TWX to North American, Attn.: E. E. Sack and Alan
B. Kehlet, 4 Nov. 1963; Bellcomm, "Recommended Changes in the Use
of Space Vehicles in the Apollo Test Program," NASA OMSF technical
memo MD (S) 3100.180, 29 Oct. 1963; Webb to Col. C. J. George, no subj.,
10 March 1964; MSC news release 180-63, 18 Oct. 1963.<p>
<a name = "source28"><b>28</b>.</a> House Committee on Science and
Astronautics, <cite>1965 NASA Authorization: Hearings on H.R. 9641
(Superseded by H.R. 10456),</cite> 88th Cong., 2nd sess., 1964, pp.
154-56; Bothmer, MSFMC meeting, 29 Oct. 1963; Hammock TWX, 4 Nov. 1963;
von Braun to Mueller, 8 Nov. 1963, with encs.; von Braun, interviews,
Washington, 27 Aug. 1970 and 30 Nov. 1971, and Houston, 3 Feb. 1972;
Shea, interview, Waltham, Mass., 12 Jan. 1972; Jay Holmes, minutes of
Special OMSF Staff Meeting, 31 Jan. 1964.<p>
<a name = "source29"><b>29</b>.</a> See Philip H. Abelson's editorials
in <cite>Science,</cite> late 1963 to early 1964; John Barbour,
"Scientist Abelson Raps Race for Man on Moon,"
<cite>Washington Evening Star,</cite> 2 Sept. 1963; Amitai Etzioni,
<cite>The Moon-Doggle: Domestic and International Implications of the
Space Race</cite> (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1964); Edwin Diamond,
<cite>The Rise and Fall of the Space Age</cite> (Garden City: Doubleday,
1964). Cf. Robert Hotz, "Space Flight Enters New Period to Exploit
Capabilities of Man for Probing Universe," editorial in
<cite>Aviation Week & Space Technology</cite> 79, Manned Space
Flight ed. (22 July 1963): 68-69.
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