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Blind SSRF in /home/testslack endpoint

Moderate
medariox published GHSA-8mcr-vffr-jwxv Dec 18, 2023

Package

medusa/notifiers/slack.py

Affected versions

<1.0.19

Patched versions

1.0.19

Description

GitHub Security Lab (GHSL) Vulnerability Report, Medusa: GHSL-2023-201

The GitHub Security Lab team has identified potential security vulnerabilities in Medusa.

We are committed to working with you to help resolve these issues. In this report you will find everything you need to effectively coordinate a resolution of these issues with the GHSL team.

If at any point you have concerns or questions about this process, please do not hesitate to reach out to us at securitylab@github.com (please include GHSL-2023-201 as a reference).

If you are NOT the correct point of contact for this report, please let us know!

Summary

Medusa contains an unauthenticated blind server-side request forgery (SSRF).

Project

Medusa

Tested Version

1.0.17

Details

Issue 1: Blind SSRF in /home/testslack endpoint (GHSL-2023-201)

The testslack request handler in medusa/server/web/home/handler.py does not validate the user-controlled slack_webhook variable and passes it to the notifiers.slack_notifier.test_notify method, then _notify_slack and finally _send_slack method, which sends a POST request to the user-controlled URL on line 103 in /medusa/notifiers/slack.py, which leads to a blind server-side request forgery (SSRF).

def _send_slack(self, message=None, webhook=None):
    """Send the http request using the Slack webhook."""
    webhook = webhook or app.SLACK_WEBHOOK

    log.info('Sending slack message: {message}', {'message': message})
    log.info('Sending slack message  to url: {url}', {'url': webhook})

    headers = {'Content-Type': 'application/json'}
    data = {
        'text': message,
        'username': 'MedusaBot',
        'icon_url': 'https://cdn.pymedusa.com/images/ico/favicon-310.png'
    }

    try:
        r = requests.post(webhook, data=json.dumps(data), headers=headers)
        r.raise_for_status()
    except Exception:
        log.exception('Error Sending Slack message')
        return False

    return True

This issue was found with the CodeQL query Full server-side request forgery.

Impact

This issue allows for crafting POST requests on behalf of the Medusa server.

Proof of Concept

  1. Start a simple python web server, f.ex. this one. This code will start a web server on http://127.0.0.1:9000
  2. Start Medusa. We assume that it is running on http://localhost:8081.
  3. Send the following request:
curl -X GET 'http://localhost:8081/home/testslack?slack_webhook=http://127.0.0.1:9000/'

Based on the response, we can infer if the request succeeded (returned HTTP status 2xx). If it did, we will receive a response:
Slack notification succeeded. Check your Slack channel to make sure it worked

If the request resulted in an error, it will raise an exception and we will receive:
Error sending Slack notification

Remediation

If possible, use an allowlist with allowed domains to limit the possibility to send POST requests on behalf of Medusa.

GitHub Security Advisories

We recommend you create a private GitHub Security Advisory for these findings. This also allows you to invite the GHSL team to collaborate and further discuss these findings in private before they are published.

Credit

These issues were discovered and reported by GHSL team member @sylwia-budzynska (Sylwia Budzynska).

Contact

You can contact the GHSL team at securitylab@github.com, please include a reference to GHSL-2023-201 in any communication regarding these issues.

Disclosure Policy

This report is subject to a 90-day disclosure deadline, as described in more detail in our coordinated disclosure policy.

Severity

Moderate
5.3
/ 10

CVSS base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
None
Availability
None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

CVE ID

CVE-2023-50259

Weaknesses

Credits