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A76: Improvements to the Ring Hash LB Policy #412

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159 changes: 159 additions & 0 deletions A76-ring-hash-improvements.md
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A76: Improvements to the Ring Hash LB Policy
----
* Author(s): atollena
* Approver: markdroth
* Status: Draft
* Implemented in: <language, ...>
* Last updated: 2024-01-23
* Discussion at: https://groups.google.com/g/grpc-io/c/ZKI1RIF0e_s/m/oBXqOFb0AQAJ

## Abstract

This proposal describes two improvements to the `ring_hash` load balancing
policy:

1. The ability to use ring hash without xDS, by extending the policy
configuration to define the [request header][header] to use as the request
hash key.
2. The ability to specify endpoint hash keys explicitly, instead of hashing the
endpoint IP address.

## Background

### Terminology

* The *request hash key*, after being hashed, defines where a given request is
to be placed on the ring in order to find the closest endpoints.
* The *endpoint hash key*, after being hashed, determines the locations of an
endpoint on the ring.

### Using ring hash without xDS by explicitly setting the request hash key

gRPC supports the `ring_hash` load balancing policy for consistent hashing. This
policy currently requires using xDS for configuration because users have no
other way to configure the hash for a request but to use the route configuration
`hash_policy` field in the `RouteAction` route configuration. This makes the
`ring_hash` policy unusable without an xDS infrastructure in place.

This proposal extends the configuration of `ring_hash` policy to specify a
header to hash. This will make it possible to use `ring_hash` by configuring it
entirely in the [service config][service-config]. If this configuration is
omitted, we will preserve the current behavior of using the xDS hash policy.

### Using an explicit endpoint hash key

Another limitation of the current `ring_hash` load balancing policy is that it
always hashes the endpoint IP address to place the endpoints on the ring. In
some scenario, this choice is not ideal: for example, [Kubernetes
Statefulsets](https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/statefulset/)
offer a way to configure workloads with sticky identity such that endpoints keep
storage and network identifier across restarts. However, the IP address may
change across restarts. After a deployment, if all IP addresses have changed,
then a completely new ring has to be constructed, even though it may have been
desirable to keep the ring unchanged based on the Statefulsets identities, so
that each instance stays at the same location on the ring.

Envoy offers a solution to control endpoint hashes independently of IP
addresses. This mechanism uses the `"envoy.lb"`
[LbEndpoint.Metadata][LbEndpoint.Metadata] field `hash_key` value available in
EDS instead of the endpoint IP address, as described in [the Envoy documentation
for ring hash][envoy-ringhash]. This proposal adds support for setting the
endpoint hash key explicitly via EDS by reusing the configuration mechanism
implemented in Envoy. To retain the advantage of being able to use `ring_hash`
without xDS, custom gRPC name resolvers will be able to set this endpoint
attribute through the language specific resolver attribute interface.

### Related Proposals:

This proposal extends the following existing gRFC:

* [gRFC A42: xDS Ring Hash LB Policy][A42]
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It's probably also worth referencing A61, which significantly simplified the ring_hash picker logic.

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@atollena atollena Apr 2, 2024

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OK, thanks for pointing this out, I wasn't aware of A61's impact on ring hash. I spent some time to understand how that affects the implementation I started in Go. Go implements A62 (pick first sticky transient failure) but not A61, so it cannot take advantage of this without further refactoring the ring hash policy. I'll sync up with the Go team to see what the best path forward is, but I imagine it'd be best to start with implementing at least part of A61 (delegating to pick_first).

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After a quick discussion with @dfawley I decided to try to implement this before A61. I think the proposal could be more clear in this case, at least for Go, because there is a difference between immediately attempting to connect (which happens only for subchannels in "idle" state), and queuing a connect for subchannels in transient failure, where a connection attempt will be triggered when the subchannel returns to idle state after the connection backoff.

I implemented the new behavior of scanning forward for a ready subchannel, either when:

  1. the subchannel picked randomly is idle (immediate connection attempt triggered) or,
  2. the subchannel picked randomly is in transient failure (connection attempt queued)

I think it has the desired behaviour of making sure we don't trigger more than one connection attempt on each pick if there is a ready subchannel, not adding latency if there is a ready subchannel, and converge to random. But I also considered only implementing the scanning forward for ready subchannel when we triggered an immediate connection attempt, which happens when either:

  1. the picked subchannel is idle
  2. the picked subchannel is in transient failure, and the second is idle
  3. the picked suchannel is in transient failure, the second is also in transient failure, and we found an idle connection before a ready one when scanning the ring forward.

This ambiguity will disappear when all implementations have A61 implemented. This is planned for this quarter for Go, IIUC, but I imagine there may be reasons for some implementations to want to implement A76 before A61. My question is whether you think it's worth adding a note about it in this gRFC to lift this ambiguity.

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My inclination is that this logic is already complicated enough to understand, so I'd prefer to avoid muddying the waters by trying to do this without having first implemented the relevant parts of A61. From first glance, what you describe here seems reasonable, but I think I'd have to stare at it for a lot longer to convince myself it didn't have any potential pitfalls.

@dfawley, is it not feasible to implement just the ring_hash part of A61 before implementing this change?

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## Proposal

### Explicitly setting the request hash key

A new field `request_hash_header` will be added to the `ring_hash` policy
config:

```proto
message RingHashLoadBalancingConfig {
// (existing fields omitted)
string request_hash_header = 3;
}
```

Upon loading the load balancing config, if the `request_hash_header` field
contains a value that is not a valid header name, then the configuration is
rejected. If the `request_hash_header` refers to a binary header (suffixed with
`-bin`), the configuration is also rejected.

At pick time:
- If `request_hash_header` is not empty, and the header has a non-empty value,
then the request hash key will be set to this value. If `request_hash_header`
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contains multiple values, then values are joined with a comma `,` character
between each value before hashing.
- If `request_hash_header` is not empty, and the request has no value or an
empty value associated with the header defined, then the picker will generate a
random hash for it. The use of a random hash key will effectively sends the
request to a random endpoint.
- If `request_hash_header` is empty, then the request hash key will be based on
the xDS hash policy in RDS, which keeps the existing LB configuration for ring
hash working as before with xDS.

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### Explicitly setting the endpoint hash key

The `ring_hash` policy will be changed such that the hash key used for
determining the locations of each endpoint on the ring will be extracted from a
pre-defined endpoint attribute called `hash_key`. If this attribute is set, then
the endpoint is placed on the ring by hashing its value. If this attribute is
not set or empty, then the endpoint IP address is hashed, matching the current
behavior. The locations of an existing endpoint on the ring is updated if its
`hash_key` endpoint attribute changes.

For xDS, the cluster resolver LB policy responsible for translating EDS
responses into resolver endpoints will be changed to set the `hash_key` endpoint
attribute to the value of [LbEndpoint.Metadata][LbEndpoint.Metadata] `envoy.lb`
`hash_key` field, as described in [Envoy's documentation for the ring hash load
balancer][envoy-ring-hash].

### Temporary environment variable protection

Explicitly setting the request hash key cannot possibly lead to problem with
existing deployment because the new behavior requires setting a load balancing
policy configuration field that did not exist before. Therefore, it is not gated
behind an environment variable.

Adding support for the hash_key in xDS endpoint metadata could potentially break
existing clients whose control plane is setting this key, because upgrading the
client to a new version of gRPC would automatically cause the key to start being
used. We expect that this change will not cause problems for most users, but
just in case there is a problem, we will provide a migration story by supporting
a temporary mechanism to tell gRPC to ignore the `hash_key` endpoint
metadata. This will be enabled by setting the
`GRPC_XDS_ENDPOINT_HASH_KEY_BACKWARD_COMPAT` environment variable to true. This
mechanism will be supported for a couple of gRPC releases but will be removed in
the long run.

## Rationale

We originally proposed using language specific interfaces to set the request
hash key. The advantage would have been that the request hash key would not have
to be exposed through gRPC outgoing headers. However, this would have required
defining language specific APIs, which would increase the complexity of this
change.

We also discussed the option of exposing all `LbEndpoint.metadata` from EDS
through name resolver attributes, instead of only extracting the specific
`hash_key` attribute, so as to make them available to custom LB policies. We
decided to keep only extract `hash_key` to limit the scope of this gRFC.

## Implementation

Will provide an implementation in Go.

[A42]: A42-xds-ring-hash-lb-policy.md
[envoy-ringhash]: https://www.envoyproxy.io/docs/envoy/latest/intro/arch_overview/upstream/load_balancing/load_balancers#ring-hash
[header]: https://grpc.io/docs/guides/metadata/#headers
[service-config]: https://github.com/grpc/grpc/blob/master/doc/service_config.md
[LbEndpoint.Metadata]: https://www.envoyproxy.io/docs/envoy/latest/api-v3/config/endpoint/v3/endpoint_components.proto#envoy-v3-api-field-config-endpoint-v3-lbendpoint-metadata