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🔍 Vulnerabilities of ghcr.io/uniget-org/tools/imgcrypt:1.1.9

📦 Image Reference ghcr.io/uniget-org/tools/imgcrypt:1.1.9

digest	sha256:a1e808b259c8fda5237841943c0f5207d8161340257c88966a5cabcbab74aea0
vulnerabilities
platform	linux/amd64
size	26 MB
packages	53

github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v3 3.0.0 (golang) pkg:golang/github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v3@3.0.0 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption Affected range <3.0.1 Fixed version 3.0.1 Description The go-jose package is subject to a "billion hashes attack" causing denial-of-service when decrypting JWE inputs. This occurs when an attacker can provide a PBES2 encrypted JWE blob with a very large p2c value that, when decrypted, produces a denial-of-service. OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A9 - Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities Affected range Fixed version v3.0.1 Description The go-jose package is subject to a "billion hashes attack" causing denial-of-service when decrypting JWE inputs. This occurs when an attacker can provide a PBES2 encrypted JWE blob with a very large p2c value that, when decrypted, produces a denial-of-service.

golang.org/x/crypto 0.14.0 (golang) pkg:golang/golang.org/x/crypto@0.14.0 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity Affected range <0.17.0 Fixed version 0.17.0 CVSS Score 5.9 CVSS Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N Description Summary Terrapin is a prefix truncation attack targeting the SSH protocol. More precisely, Terrapin breaks the integrity of SSH's secure channel. By carefully adjusting the sequence numbers during the handshake, an attacker can remove an arbitrary amount of messages sent by the client or server at the beginning of the secure channel without the client or server noticing it. Mitigations To mitigate this protocol vulnerability, OpenSSH suggested a so-called "strict kex" which alters the SSH handshake to ensure a Man-in-the-Middle attacker cannot introduce unauthenticated messages as well as convey sequence number manipulation across handshakes. Warning: To take effect, both the client and server must support this countermeasure. As a stop-gap measure, peers may also (temporarily) disable the affected algorithms and use unaffected alternatives like AES-GCM instead until patches are available. Details The SSH specifications of ChaCha20-Poly1305 (chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com) and Encrypt-then-MAC (*-etm@openssh.com MACs) are vulnerable against an arbitrary prefix truncation attack (a.k.a. Terrapin attack). This allows for an extension negotiation downgrade by stripping the SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO sent after the first message after SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS, downgrading security, and disabling attack countermeasures in some versions of OpenSSH. When targeting Encrypt-then-MAC, this attack requires the use of a CBC cipher to be practically exploitable due to the internal workings of the cipher mode. Additionally, this novel attack technique can be used to exploit previously unexploitable implementation flaws in a Man-in-the-Middle scenario. The attack works by an attacker injecting an arbitrary number of SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages during the initial key exchange and consequently removing the same number of messages just after the initial key exchange has concluded. This is possible due to missing authentication of the excess SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages and the fact that the implicit sequence numbers used within the SSH protocol are only checked after the initial key exchange. In the case of ChaCha20-Poly1305, the attack is guaranteed to work on every connection as this cipher does not maintain an internal state other than the message's sequence number. In the case of Encrypt-Then-MAC, practical exploitation requires the use of a CBC cipher; while theoretical integrity is broken for all ciphers when using this mode, message processing will fail at the application layer for CTR and stream ciphers. For more details see https://terrapin-attack.com. Impact This attack targets the specification of ChaCha20-Poly1305 (chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com) and Encrypt-then-MAC (*-etm@openssh.com), which are widely adopted by well-known SSH implementations and can be considered de-facto standard. These algorithms can be practically exploited; however, in the case of Encrypt-Then-MAC, we additionally require the use of a CBC cipher. As a consequence, this attack works against all well-behaving SSH implementations supporting either of those algorithms and can be used to downgrade (but not fully strip) connection security in case SSH extension negotiation (RFC8308) is supported. The attack may also enable attackers to exploit certain implementation flaws in a man-in-the-middle (MitM) scenario.

github.com/containerd/containerd 1.6.23 (golang) pkg:golang/github.com/containerd/containerd@1.6.23 Affected range <=1.6.25 Fixed version 1.6.26 Description /sys/devices/virtual/powercap accessible by default to containers Intel's RAPL (Running Average Power Limit) feature, introduced by the Sandy Bridge microarchitecture, provides software insights into hardware energy consumption. To facilitate this, Intel introduced the powercap framework in Linux kernel 3.13, which reads values via relevant MSRs (model specific registers) and provides unprivileged userspace access via sysfs. As RAPL is an interface to access a hardware feature, it is only available when running on bare metal with the module compiled into the kernel. By 2019, it was realized that in some cases unprivileged access to RAPL readings could be exploited as a power-based side-channel against security features including AES-NI (potentially inside a SGX enclave) and KASLR (kernel address space layout randomization). Also known as the PLATYPUS attack, Intel assigned CVE-2020-8694 and CVE-2020-8695, and AMD assigned CVE-2020-12912. Several mitigations were applied; Intel reduced the sampling resolution via a microcode update, and the Linux kernel prevents access by non-root users since 5.10. However, this kernel-based mitigation does not apply to many container-based scenarios: Unless using user namespaces, root inside a container has the same level of privilege as root outside the container, but with a slightly more narrow view of the system sysfs is mounted inside containers read-only; however only read access is needed to carry out this attack on an unpatched CPU While this is not a direct vulnerability in container runtimes, defense in depth and safe defaults are valuable and preferred, especially as this poses a risk to multi-tenant container environments. This is provided by masking /sys/devices/virtual/powercap in the default mount configuration, and adding an additional set of rules to deny it in the default AppArmor profile. While sysfs is not the only way to read from the RAPL subsystem, other ways of accessing it require additional capabilities such as CAP_SYS_RAWIO which is not available to containers by default, or perf paranoia level less than 1, which is a non-default kernel tunable. References https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-8694 https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-8695 https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-12912 https://platypusattack.com/ https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=949dd0104c496fa7c14991a23c03c62e44637e71 https://web.eece.maine.edu/~vweaver/projects/rapl/

[github-actions]

Attempting automerge. See https://github.com/uniget-org/tools/actions/runs/7366452624.

[github-actions]

PR is blocked and can not be merged. See https://github.com/uniget-org/tools/actions/runs/7366452624.