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chore(deps): update dependency spiffe/spire to v1.9.5 #4600
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Auto-approved because label type/renovate is present.
🔍 Vulnerabilities of
|
digest | sha256:a941ff638b25a3859fcef47cafa3bfcaf6b6c23ea842835e518c541079431fc1 |
vulnerabilities | |
platform | linux/amd64 |
size | 54 MB |
packages | 318 |
github.com/sigstore/cosign/v2
|
Affected range | <=2.2.3 |
Fixed version | 2.2.4 |
CVSS Score | 4.2 |
CVSS Vector | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H |
Description
Maliciously-crafted software artifacts can cause denial of service of the machine running Cosign, thereby impacting all services on the machine. The root cause is that Cosign creates slices based on the number of signatures, manifests or attestations in untrusted artifacts. As such, the untrusted artifact can control the amount of memory that Cosign allocates.
As an example, these lines demonstrate the problem:
This
Get()
method gets the manifest of the image, allocates a slice equal to the length of the layers in the manifest, loops through the layers and adds a new signature to the slice.The exact issue is Cosign allocates excessive memory on the lines that creates a slice of the same length as the manifests.
Remediation
Update to the latest version of Cosign, where the number of attestations, signatures and manifests has been limited to a reasonable value.
Cosign PoC
In the case of this API (also referenced above):
… The first line can contain a length that is safe for the system and will not throw a runtime panic or be blocked by other safety mechanisms. For the sake of argument, let’s say that the length of
m, err := s.Manifest()
is the max allowed (by the machine without throwing OOM panics) manifests minus 1. When Cosign then allocates a new slice on this line:signatures := make([]oci.Signature, 0, len(m.Layers))
, Cosign will allocate more memory than is available and the machine will be denied of service, causing Cosign and all other services on the machine to be unavailable.To illustrate the issue here, we run a modified version of
TestSignedImageIndex()
inpkg/oci/remote
:Here,
wantLayers
is the number of manifests from these lines:To test this, we want to make
wantLayers
high enough to not cause a memory on its own but still trigger the machine-wide OOM when a slice gets create with the same length. On my local machine, it would take hours to create a slice of layers that fulfils that criteria, so instead I modify the Cosign production code to reflect a long list of manifests:// Get implements oci.Signatures func (s *sigs) Get() ([]oci.Signature, error) { m, err := s.Manifest() if err != nil { return nil, err } // Here we imitate a long list of manifests ms := make([]byte, 2600000000) // imitate a long list of manifests signatures := make([]oci.Signature, 0, len(ms)) panic("Done") //signatures := make([]oci.Signature, 0, len(m.Layers)) for _, desc := range m.Layers {With this modified code, if we can cause an OOM without triggering the
panic("Done")
, we have succeeded.
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Affected range | <=2.2.3 |
Fixed version | 2.2.4 |
CVSS Score | 4.2 |
CVSS Vector | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H |
Description
Summary
A remote image with a malicious attachment can cause denial of service of the host machine running Cosign. This can impact other services on the machine that rely on having memory available such as a Redis database which can result in data loss. It can also impact the availability of other services on the machine that will not be available for the duration of the machine denial.
Details
The root cause of this issue is that Cosign reads the attachment from a remote image entirely into memory without checking the size of the attachment first. As such, a large attachment can make Cosign read a large attachment into memory; If the attachments size is larger than the machine has memory available, the machine will be denied of service. The Go runtime will make a
SIGKILL
after a few seconds of system-wide denial.The root cause is that Cosign reads the contents of the attachments entirely into memory on line 238 below:
...and prior to that, neither Cosign nor go-containerregistry checks the size of the attachment and enforces a max cap. In the case of a remote layer of
f *attached
, go-containerregistry will invoke this API:func (rl *remoteLayer) Compressed() (io.ReadCloser, error) { // We don't want to log binary layers -- this can break terminals. ctx := redact.NewContext(rl.ctx, "omitting binary blobs from logs") return rl.fetcher.fetchBlob(ctx, verify.SizeUnknown, rl.digest) }Notice that the second argument to
rl.fetcher.fetchBlob
isverify.SizeUnknown
which results in not using theio.LimitReader
inverify.ReadCloser
:
https://github.com/google/go-containerregistry/blob/a0658aa1d0cc7a7f1bcc4a3af9155335b6943f40/internal/verify/verify.go#L82-L100func ReadCloser(r io.ReadCloser, size int64, h v1.Hash) (io.ReadCloser, error) { w, err := v1.Hasher(h.Algorithm) if err != nil { return nil, err } r2 := io.TeeReader(r, w) // pass all writes to the hasher. if size != SizeUnknown { r2 = io.LimitReader(r2, size) // if we know the size, limit to that size. } return &and.ReadCloser{ Reader: &verifyReader{ inner: r2, hasher: w, expected: h, wantSize: size, }, CloseFunc: r.Close, }, nil }Impact
This issue can allow a supply-chain escalation from a compromised registry to the Cosign user: If an attacher has compromised a registry or the account of an image vendor, they can include a malicious attachment and hurt the image consumer.
Remediation
Update to the latest version of Cosign, which limits the number of attachments. An environment variable can override this value.
github.com/docker/docker 25.0.4+incompatible
(golang)
pkg:golang/github.com/docker/docker@25.0.4+incompatible
Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres
Affected range | >=25.0.0 |
Fixed version | 25.0.5 |
CVSS Score | 5.9 |
CVSS Vector | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N |
Description
Moby is an open source container framework originally developed by Docker Inc. as Docker. It is a key component of Docker Engine, Docker Desktop, and other distributions of container tooling or runtimes. As a batteries-included container runtime, Moby comes with a built-in networking implementation that enables communication between containers, and between containers and external resources.
Moby's networking implementation allows for creating and using many networks, each with their own subnet and gateway. This feature is frequently referred to as custom networks, as each network can have a different driver, set of parameters, and thus behaviors. When creating a network, the
--internal
flag is used to designate a network as internal. Theinternal
attribute in a docker-compose.yml file may also be used to mark a network internal, and other API clients may specify theinternal
parameter as well.When containers with networking are created, they are assigned unique network interfaces and IP addresses (typically from a non-routable RFC 1918 subnet). The root network namespace (hereafter referred to as the 'host') serves as a router for non-internal networks, with a gateway IP that provides SNAT/DNAT to/from container IPs.
Containers on an internal network may communicate between each other, but are precluded from communicating with any networks the host has access to (LAN or WAN) as no default route is configured, and firewall rules are set up to drop all outgoing traffic. Communication with the gateway IP address (and thus appropriately configured host services) is possible, and the host may communicate with any container IP directly.
In addition to configuring the Linux kernel's various networking features to enable container networking,
dockerd
directly provides some services to container networks. Principal among these is serving as a resolver, enabling service discovery (looking up other containers on the network by name), and resolution of names from an upstream resolver.When a DNS request for a name that does not correspond to a container is received, the request is forwarded to the configured upstream resolver (by default, the host's configured resolver). This request is made from the container network namespace: the level of access and routing of traffic is the same as if the request was made by the container itself.
As a consequence of this design, containers solely attached to internal network(s) will be unable to resolve names using the upstream resolver, as the container itself is unable to communicate with that nameserver. Only the names of containers also attached to the internal network are able to be resolved.
Many systems will run a local forwarding DNS resolver, typically present on a loopback address (
127.0.0.0/8
), such as systemd-resolved or dnsmasq. Common loopback address examples include127.0.0.1
or127.0.0.53
. As the host and any containers have separate loopback devices, a consequence of the design described above is that containers are unable to resolve names from the host's configured resolver, as they cannot reach these addresses on the host loopback device.To bridge this gap, and to allow containers to properly resolve names even when a local forwarding resolver is used on a loopback address,
dockerd
will detect this scenario and instead forward DNS requests from the host/root network namespace. The loopback resolver will then forward the requests to its configured upstream resolvers, as expected.Impact
Because
dockerd
will forward DNS requests to the host loopback device, bypassing the container network namespace's normal routing semantics entirely, internal networks can unexpectedly forward DNS requests to an external nameserver.By registering a domain for which they control the authoritative nameservers, an attacker could arrange for a compromised container to exfiltrate data by encoding it in DNS queries that will eventually be answered by their nameservers. For example, if the domain
evil.example
was registered, the authoritative nameserver(s) for that domain could (eventually and indirectly) receive a request forthis-is-a-secret.evil.example
.Docker Desktop is not affected, as Docker Desktop always runs an internal resolver on a RFC 1918 address.
Patches
Moby releases 26.0.0-rc3, 25.0.5 (released) and 23.0.11 (to be released) are patched to prevent forwarding DNS requests from internal networks.
Workarounds
- Run containers intended to be solely attached to internal networks with a custom upstream address (
--dns
argument todocker run
, or API equivalent), which will force all upstream DNS queries to be resolved from the container network namespace.Background
- yair zak originally reported this issue to the Docker security team.
- PR libnet: Don't forward to upstream resolvers on internal nw moby/moby#46609 was opened in public to fix this issue, as it was not originally considered to have a security implication.
- The official documentation claims that "the
--internal
flag that will completely isolate containers on a network from any communications external to that network," which necessitated this advisory and CVE.
Attempting automerge. See https://github.com/uniget-org/tools/actions/runs/8994679730. |
PR has unknown mergeable_state (unstable) and can not be merged. See https://github.com/uniget-org/tools/actions/runs/8994679730. |
This PR contains the following updates:
1.9.4
->1.9.5
Warning
Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the Dependency Dashboard for more information.
Release Notes
spiffe/spire (spiffe/spire)
v1.9.5
Compare Source
Security
Configuration
📅 Schedule: Branch creation - At any time (no schedule defined), Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).
🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.
♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.
🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.
This PR has been generated by Renovate Bot.