crypto: add RSA-PSS params to asymmetricKeyDetails #39851
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cc @nodejs/crypto I'm not so sure about the property names. On the one hand, I'd like to align them with RFC3447. On the other hand, the hash function that is used by MGF1 is not a named property in that RFC. Also, it would be great if the Input appreciated. |
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Also, some of the older crypto APIs are inconsistent w.r.t. short vs long names (e.g.,
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panva
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Aug 23, 2021
It does?! Wow, let's align the names and expose those via documentation as well. |
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I took the liberty to
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I will push the alignment of yet undocumented key gen parameters with what we expose here as a separate PR marked semver-major to be on the safe side. Edit: #39927 |
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I am still unsure what the best param names are.
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Fixes: #39837 Refs: openssl/openssl#10568 PR-URL: #39851 Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com> Reviewed-By: Filip Skokan <panva.ip@gmail.com>
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Fixes: #39837 Refs: openssl/openssl#10568 PR-URL: #39851 Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com> Reviewed-By: Filip Skokan <panva.ip@gmail.com>
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Fixes: #39837 Refs: openssl/openssl#10568 PR-URL: #39851 Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com> Reviewed-By: Filip Skokan <panva.ip@gmail.com>
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Notable changes: crypto: * (SEMVER-MINOR) add RSA-PSS params to asymmetricKeyDetails (Tobias Nießen) #39851 deps: * (SEMVER-MINOR) add corepack (Maël Nison) #39608 * (SEMVER-MINOR) update V8 to 9.3.345.16 (Michaël Zasso) #39947 module: * (SEMVER-MINOR) support pattern trailers (Guy Bedford) #39635 stream: * (SEMVER-MINOR) add stream.compose (Robert Nagy) #39029 PR-URL: #40011
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Notable changes: crypto: * (SEMVER-MINOR) add RSA-PSS params to asymmetricKeyDetails (Tobias Nießen) #39851 deps: * (SEMVER-MINOR) add corepack (Maël Nison) #39608 * (SEMVER-MINOR) update V8 to 9.3.345.16 (Michaël Zasso) #39947 module: * (SEMVER-MINOR) support pattern trailers (Guy Bedford) #39635 stream: * (SEMVER-MINOR) add stream.compose (Robert Nagy) #39029 PR-URL: #40011
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Notable changes: crypto: * (SEMVER-MINOR) add RSA-PSS params to asymmetricKeyDetails (Tobias Nießen) #39851 deps: * (SEMVER-MINOR) add corepack (Maël Nison) #39608 * (SEMVER-MINOR) update V8 to 9.3.345.16 (Michaël Zasso) #39947 module: * (SEMVER-MINOR) support pattern trailers (Guy Bedford) #39635 stream: * (SEMVER-MINOR) add stream.compose (Robert Nagy) #39029 PR-URL: #40011
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This CL adds a maskHash member to the rsa_pss_params_st struct for increased compatibility with OpenSSL: https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/main:third_party/perl/c/include/openssl/rsa.h;l=282-289 Node.js recently began to make use of this member in nodejs/node#39851 and without this member Electron sees compilation errors. Change-Id: Ibd18a31605b0a715edb279a3bca4b4f05e679767 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49365 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Regarding backporting this to older versions, I'm assuming this is NOT for 14.x or older? Backporting this would require bumping OpenSSL dependency to 1.1.1e and for distros that backport fixes for OpenSSL, this could be problematic. |
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@AdamMajer both 12 and 14 are now in maintenance and won't be getting this feature (or its dependencies) backported. |
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* Document that SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD should configure signing prefs.
Otherwise BoringSSL may select one the private key does not support.
Change-Id: Ia0a57657bd6dedaa6653c23cc850bb6b6fa8f219
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48525
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Add convenience functions to malloc EVP_HPKE_CTX and EVP_HPKE_KEY.
Some callers want the value to be heap-allocated. It's a little annoying
that this returns an empty value (if we only supported heap-allocated
ones, I'd have merged init into new), but since we have multiple
constructor functions, this is probably the least fuss.
Change-Id: I42f586e39850954fb6743f8be50a7cfffa0755ba
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48526
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Check strtoul return for overflow error in GetUnsigned()
Currently, GetUnsigned() calls strtoul and checks whether the resulting
unsigned long int is greater than UINT_MAX. This implicitly assumes that
UINT_MAX < ULONG_MAX.
Problematically, `unsigned long int` and `unsigned` have the same size
on Windows [0] and on 32-bit architectures.
For correctness, we now check whether strtoul failed because it would
overflow the unsigned long int before checking whether the value fits in
an unsigned type.
[0]: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/cpp/data-type-ranges?view=msvc-160
Change-Id: I49702febf4543bfb7991592717443e0b2adb954f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48545
Commit-Queue: Dan McArdle <dmcardle@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
* Don't enable atomics in NO_THREADS configurations.
In configurations without threads, we're not thread-safe anyway. Instead
use the refcount_lock.c implementation which, in turn, calls into
thread_none.c, so this turns into a plain refcount.
This avoids a build issue on platforms which define NO_THREADS, use C11,
lack C11 atomics, and are missing a __STDC_NO_ATOMICS__ definition. The
platforms ought to define __STDC_NO_ATOMICS__ or implement them, but
atomics are also unnecessary overheard in NO_THREADS configurations
anyway.
Change-Id: I927e1825dd6474d95226b93dad704594f120450a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48565
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Add 'generate-ech' command to bssl tool
The tool generates three files: an ECHConfig, its corresponding private
key, and the ECHConfig wrapped in an ECHConfigList.
For example, the following invocation generates the files:
bssl generate-ech \
-out-ech-config-list ech_config_list.data \
-out-ech-config ech_config.data \
-out-private-key ech.key \
-public-name foo.example \
-config-id 0
Now, we can pass the ECHConfig and private key into the 'server' and
'client' commands:
bssl server -accept 4430 \
-ech-config ech_config.data \
-ech-key ech.key
bssl client -connect localhost:4430 \
-ech-config-list ech_config_list.data
Bug: 275
Change-Id: Id4342855483fb01aa956f9aff356105c4a8ca4f6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48466
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
* acvp: add HKDF support.
Change-Id: I26251ce85f2cb1b441ae415b1506161a90bd3efa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48585
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
* Revert "Revert "Revert "Disable check that X.509 extensions implies v3."""
This reverts commit be9a86f459f8e785bac42abcea5d13bd4ded251e. Let's try
this again.
Bug: 375
Change-Id: Ie01cced8017835b2cc6d80e5e81a4508a37fbbaf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48625
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
* acvp: recognise another style of JSON.
Some JSON files have a header, but without a URL. Thus consider a block
that doesn't contain an algorithm to also be a header.
Change-Id: Ic35a827843e9d0169ba8398df69c46a5baeffb44
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48605
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
* Don't overread in poly_Rq_mul
The polynomials have 701, 16-bit values. But poly_Rq_mul was reading 32
bytes at offset 1384 in order to get the last 18 of them. This silently
worked for a long time, but when 7153013019 switched to keeping
variables on the stack it was noticed by Valgrind.
This change fixes the overread. Setting watchpoints at the ends of the
two inputs (and one output) now shows no overreads nor overwrites.
BUG=424
Change-Id: Id86c1407ffce66593541c10feee47213f4b95c5d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48645
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
* generate_ech.cc: include needed headers
Change-Id: I04c8bb68801aeb0938e5b038b98811ca4ffe50f0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48685
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
* Clarify BIO_new_mum_buf's lifetime rules.
It is not obvious from "It does not take ownership of |buf|" whether the
function makes a copy or not. It does not make a copy (maybe it
should...), so callers are obligated to manage their lifetimes.
Change-Id: I7df9a5814321fd833fcb8d009d9e0318d6668dd4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48669
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Document another batch of functions.
This covers most of the ASN.1 time functions and a handful more of
x509.h. Also remove some code under #if 0.
I'm running out of a easy ones to do, which is probably a good thing.
Change-Id: I085b1e2a54d191a7a5f18c801b3c135cfda7bd88
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48665
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Remove ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING.
This flag is set when an ASN1_STRING is created from a codepath that is
aware it is an "mstring" (CHOICE of multiple string or string-like
types). With setters like X509_set_notBefore, it is very easy to
accidentally lose the flag on some field that normally has it.
The only place the flag is checked is X509_time_adj_ex. X509_time_adj_ex
usually transparently picks UTCTime vs GeneralizedTime, as in the X.509
CHOICE type. But if writing to an existing object AND if the object
lacks the flag, it will lock to whichever type the object was
previously. It is likely any caller hitting this codepath is doing so
unintentionally and has a latent bug that won't trip until 2050.
In fact, one of the ways callers might accidentally lose the
ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING flag is by using X509_time_adj_ex!
X509_time_adj_ex(NULL) does not use an mstring-aware constructor. This
CL avoids needing such a notion in the first place.
Looking through callers, the one place that wants the old behavior is a
call site within OpenSSL, to set the producedAt field in OCSP. That
field is a GeneralizedTime, rather than a UTCTime/GeneralizedTime
CHOICE. We dropped that code, but I'm making a note of it to remember
when filing upstream.
Update-Note: ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING is no longer defined and
X509_time_adj_ex now behaves more predictably. Callers that actually
wanted to lock to a specific type should call ASN1_UTCTIME_adj or
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj instead.
Change-Id: Ib9e1c9dbd0c694e1e69f938da3992d1ffc9bd060
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48668
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Add some tests for time_t to ASN1_TIME conversions.
Change-Id: I7712f66e16b761ee23292980cff039e62d29b22f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48666
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Reject years outside 0000-9999 in ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj.
They would previously output syntax errors.
Change-Id: I7817a91d0c8ed8d6ac6a5a1fd9c9ed1223c5960e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48667
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Avoid double-expanding variables in CMake.
CMake's language is rather fragile and unsound. For the most part, it is
a shell script with more parentheses. That is, it simply expands command
arguments into a list of strings and then evaluates it, complete with
shell-style differences between "${FOO}" and ${FOO}.
The if() command is special and internally also expands variables. That
is why things like if(FOO STREQUAL "BAR") work. CMake interprets "FOO"
as a variable if it can find a variable, or a string otherwise. In
addition to getting very confused on typos, it means that
if("${FOO}" STREQUAL "BAR") will double-expand, and it will do strange
things if BAR is a variable.
CMP0054 patches this (which we set by minimum version) so that if() only
expands if the token was unquoted. This fixes
if("${FOO}" STREQUAL "BAR"). However, if(${FOO} STREQUAL "BAR")
continues to double-expand FOO.
We had a mix of all three of FOO, ${FOO}, and "${FOO}". It's not clear
which is the canonical spelling at this point, but CMake own files
(mostly) use FOO, as do most of our lines, so I've standardized on that.
It's a little unsatisfying if we typo a variable, but I suppose ${FOO}
also silently ignores unset variables.
Bug: 423
Change-Id: Ib6baa27f4065eed159e8fb28820b71a0c99e0db0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48705
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Align with upstream on 'close STDOUT' lines.
When upstreaming c1d8c5b0e0ff4177ec06eed58ebcfd5a75b7f231 as
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10883 and then
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10930, we ended up diverging
slightly: in the upstream version, I ended up applying the same change
to the xlate files. Upstream also suggested "error closing STDOUT: $!".
Apply the same changes here.
Change-Id: I8a8cbc3944432e94a8844f9f628a900edfe77b30
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48725
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Update ghashv8-armx.pl from upstream.
This syncs this file up to e7ff223a20697e5a401d2d9bb7a75e699ed46633 from
upstream's OpenSSL_1_1_1-stable branch. The main change of note is the
4x loop from upstream's 7ff2fa4b9281232f0ca1db03d42a954c462ef77d,
9ee020f8dc7813db82a119058d8f57e70e7e8904,
aa7bf316980259a11dcbaf6128ed86d33dc24b97, and
603ebe03529101424670051aa0c616dc6e037b28.
Benchmarks on a Pixel 4a.
Before:
Did 14069000 AES-128-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 2000042us (112.5 MB/sec)
Did 6768000 AES-128-GCM (256 bytes) seal operations in 2000182us (866.2 MB/sec)
Did 1902000 AES-128-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 2000479us (1283.5 MB/sec)
Did 359000 AES-128-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 2003942us (1467.6 MB/sec)
Did 182000 AES-128-GCM (16384 bytes) seal operations in 2002245us (1489.3 MB/sec)
Did 13388000 AES-256-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 2000144us (107.1 MB/sec)
Did 6069000 AES-256-GCM (256 bytes) seal operations in 2000276us (776.7 MB/sec)
Did 1638000 AES-256-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 2001076us (1105.1 MB/sec)
Did 305000 AES-256-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 2000040us (1249.3 MB/sec)
Did 155000 AES-256-GCM (16384 bytes) seal operations in 2009398us (1263.8 MB/sec)
After:
Did 13837000 AES-128-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 2000131us (110.7 MB/sec) [-1.7%]
Did 7506000 AES-128-GCM (256 bytes) seal operations in 2000197us (960.7 MB/sec) [+10.9%]
Did 2289000 AES-128-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 2000734us (1544.5 MB/sec) [+20.3%]
Did 443000 AES-128-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 2000321us (1814.2 MB/sec) [+23.6%]
Did 225000 AES-128-GCM (16384 bytes) seal operations in 2002308us (1841.1 MB/sec) [+23.6%]
Did 13280000 AES-256-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 2000011us (106.2 MB/sec) [-0.8%]
Did 6630000 AES-256-GCM (256 bytes) seal operations in 2000229us (848.5 MB/sec) [+9.2%]
Did 1916000 AES-256-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 2000373us (1293.1 MB/sec) [+17.0%]
Did 365000 AES-256-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 2001519us (1493.9 MB/sec) [+19.6%]
Did 185000 AES-256-GCM (16384 bytes) seal operations in 2006588us (1510.5 MB/sec) [+19.5%]
(See cl/387919990 for some notes I made in reviewing, though likely
future me will find them incomprehensible anyway.)
Change-Id: Id386e80143611487e07b2fbfda15d0abc54ea145
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48726
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Document ASN1_mbstring_copy.
Change-Id: Ia2cb9d969b25d1815d8157dd74125d60b138138f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48765
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Always use an ASN1_STRING_TABLE global mask of UTF8String.
ASN1_STRING_set_by_NID is very complex and depends on a "global mask"
for most NIDs. (Some NIDs use a single type and use STABLE_NO_MASK to
disable the global mask.) Historically, it defaulted to allowing all
types, but it switched to UTF8String in OpenSSL 1.0.2.
Updating the global mask is not thread-safe, and it's 2021. Let's just
always use UTF-8. The only callers I found set it to UTF-8 anyway (with
the exception of some test script we don't use, and some code that
wasn't compiled). No-op writes in the C/C++ memory model are still race
conditions, so this CL fixes some bugs in those callers.
Update-Note: The global mask for ASN1_STRING_set_by_NID is now always
UTF-8. Callers that want another type should reconsider and, if UTF-8 is
still unsuitable, just pass the actual desired type into
ASN1_mbstring_copy, X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_data, etc
Change-Id: I679e99c57da9a48c805460abcb3af5b2f938c93f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48766
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Unexport ub_* constants.
These constants aren't suitably namespaced and, moreover, are redefined
in a_strnid.c. (The constants aren't especially useful because an
X509_NAME doesn't check the upper bound.)
Update-Note: Removed some unnamespaced constants.
Change-Id: I7d15ae731628d3665119081289947600e7f38065
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48768
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Unexport BIT_STRING_BITNAME.
This type does not appear in any public APIs.
Change-Id: Ie57c7662e691ea05ff2133beda9760832ea0d0de
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48769
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Move X509_ALGOR to x509.h.
This matches OpenSSL and the name. Also accessors like X509_ALGOR_get0
are in x509.h.
Change-Id: Ic7583edcf04627cbfae822df11e75eebdd9ad7aa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48770
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Remove OPENSSL_NO_FP_API ifdefs.
We've never tested this and plenty of files depend on FILE* APIs without
ifdefs.
Change-Id: I8c51c043e068b30bdde1723c3810d3e890eabfca
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48771
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Implement ASN1_STRING_print_ex_fp, etc., with file BIOs.
No sense in implementing a BIO/FILE abstraction when BIO is itself a
FILE abstraction. Follow-up CLs will unwind the char_io abstraction and
then split the ASN1 and X509 bits of this file.
Change-Id: I00aaf2fbab44abdd88252ceb5feb071ad126a0b2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48772
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Unwind io_ch abstraction in print functions.
Change-Id: Ib342ce1acf7ea4fcff012bf149cf699807ddc0fa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48773
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Move a_strex.c back to asn1, split X509_NAME bits out.
With io_ch unwound, X509_NAME_print_ex just calls ASN1_STRING_print_ex,
so we can put all the code in the right directories. We need to
duplicate maybe_write, but it's a one-line function.
Change-Id: Ifaa9f1a24ee609cbaa24f93eb992f7d911f1b4a0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48774
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Move some ASN1 printing functions to crypto/asn1.
For some reason, ASN1_STRING_print was not in the same file as
ASN1_STRING_print_ex, but X509_print. Although it also behaves very
differently from ASN1_STRING_print_ex, so that's a little interesting.
Change-Id: I3f88f8943c8e36426eedafa7e350a787881d0c74
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48775
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Document ASN.1 printing functions.
ASN1_STRING_print_ex is extremely complex and attempting to implement
RFC2253, so write some tests for it. Along the way, unexport
CHARTYPE_*, which are internal book-keeping used in
ASN1_STRING_print_ex.
Change-Id: Idb27cd40fb66dc099d1fd6d039a00404608c2063
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48776
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Check i2d_ASN1_TYPE's return value in ASN1_STRING_print_ex.
Also use the simpler single-call variant.
Change-Id: I3834a798549f12a9dcdec6a357d2380085baf940
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48777
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Fix ASN1_STRING_print_ex with negative integers.
ASN1_STRING and ASN1_TYPE type values almost line up, but not quite.
Negative INTEGERs are not possible in X509_NAME (tag2bit maps INTEGER to
0), but negative ENUMERATEDs are (tag2bit maps ENUMERATED to
B_ASN1_UNKNOWN). See https://crbug.com/boringssl/412 for some notes on
this mess. Either way, the library will freely produce ASN1_STRING
INTEGERs and ENUMERATEDs in non-MSTRING contexts, so get this case
right.
Change-Id: Ica537f4d683e7a6becc96e2eee3cb66e53372124
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48785
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Remove ASN1_TFLG_SET_ORDER.
ASN1_TFLG_SET_ORDER was used in OpenSSL's CMS and PKCS#7
implementations, which we've removed. Fields that use it not only get
the DER SET sorting but, when serialized, go back and mutate the
original object to match.
This is unused, so remove it. This removes one of the sources of
non-const behavior in i2d functions.
Bug: 407
Change-Id: I6b2bf8d11c30a41b53d14ad475c26a1a30dfd31f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48786
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Add a test for ASN1_mbstring_copy and clean up.
In writing the tests, I noticed that the documentation was wrong. First,
the maximum lengths are measured in codepoints, not bytes.
Second, the TODO was wrong. We actually do handle this correctly,
*almost*. Rather, the bug is that the function assumes |mask| contains
no extraneous bits. If it does, all extraneous bits are interpreted as
B_ASN1_UTF8STRING. This seems like a bug, so I've gone ahead and fixed
that, with a test.
Change-Id: I7ba8fa700a8e21e6d25cb7ce879dace685eecf7e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48825
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Fix negative ENUMERATED values in multi-strings.
I noticed this while I was reading through the encoder. OpenSSL's ASN.1
library is very sloppy when it comes to reusing enums. It has...
- Universal tag numbers. These are just tag numbers from ASN.1
- utype. These are used in the ASN1_TYPE type field, as well as the
ASN1_ITEM utype fields They are the same as universal tag numbers,
except non-universal types map to V_ASN1_OTHER. I believe ASN1_TYPE
types and ASN1_ITEM utypes are the same, but I am not positive.
- ASN1_STRING types. These are the same as utypes, except V_ASN1_OTHER
appears to only be possible when embedded inside ASN1_TYPE, and
negative INTEGER and ENUMERATED values get mapped to
V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER and V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED. Additionally, some
values like V_ASN1_OBJECT are possible in a utype but not possible in
an ASN1_STRING (and will cause lots of problems if ever placed in
one).
- Sometimes one of these enums is augmented with V_ASN1_UNDEF and/or
V_ASN1_APP_CHOOSE for extra behaviors.
- Probably others I'm missing.
These get mixed up all the time. asn1_ex_i2c's MSTRING path converts
from ASN1_STRING type to utype and forgets to normalize V_ASN1_NEG_*.
This means that negative INTEGERs and ENUMERATEDs in MSTRINGs do not get
encoded right.
The negative INTEGER case is unreachable (unless the caller passes
the wrong ASN1_STRING to an MSTRING i2d function, but mismatching i2d
functions generally does wrong things), but the negative ENUMERATED case
is reachable. Fix this and add a test.
Change-Id: I762d482e72ebf03fd64bba291e751ab0b51af2a9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48805
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Fix some error returns from SSL_read and SSL_write.
It's a bit of a mess, but BIO-like APIs typically return -1 on error and
0 for EOF.
Change-Id: Ibdcb70e1009ffebf6cc6df40804dc4a178c7199e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48845
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Simplify built-in BIOs slightly.
The free callbacks can assume their inputs are non-NULL. They're only
called from BIOs of the corresponding method, which means the BIO must
exist. Also new callbacks that leave everything zero-initialized are
no-ops and can be omitted.
This removes the weird thing where the built-in free functions were
fallible. Although the int return is still necessary for compatibility
with external BIOs.
Change-Id: I91e2101efc7c77c703cb649df1490bc9f515f0fd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48846
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Add Span::first() and Span::last().
absl::Span, base::span, and std::span have first() and last() methods
which give prefixes and suffixes. first() just saves 5 characters, but
last() is nicer to write than subspan() for suffixes.
Unlike subspan(), they also do not have clipping behavior, so we're
guaranteed the length is correct. The clipping behavior comes from
absl::Span::subspan() and is not present in std::span or base::span.
I've left it in, in case we switch to absl::Span in the future, but I
imagine absl::Span will need to migrate this at some point.
Change-Id: I042dd6c566b6d753ec6de9d84e8c09ac7c270267
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48905
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Bump minimum GCC version and note impending VS2015 deprecation.
GCC 6.1 was released more than five years ago, April 27, 2016. We can
thus drop some bits in the CMake files.
https://gcc.gnu.org/releases.html
https://gcc.gnu.org/develop.html#num_scheme
Also note in BUILDING.md that VS2015 will no longer be supported next
year. Then we can cycle our CQ to testing VS2017 + VS2019. (We're
currently not testing VS2019 at all, though so far it hasn't been an
issue.) I've been running into some VS2015-only C++ issues around
conversions, so once we stop testing it, I expect it'll break.
Change-Id: I7a3020df2acd61d57409108aa4d99c840b5ca994
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48925
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Guard use of sdallocx with BORINGSSL_SDALLOCX
See comment in change and https://github.com/grpc/grpc/issues/25450
Update-note: consumers may wish to define BORINGSSL_SDALLOCX if using
tcmalloc.
Change-Id: I123fe31a6c4013f1ce0c056f82a316c71df84939
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48885
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Process the TLS 1.3 cipher suite in one place.
The cipher suite, like the version, is determined by the first server
message, independent of whether it's ServerHello or HelloRetryRequest.
We can simplify this by just processing it before we branch on which it
was.
Change-Id: I747f515e9e5b05a42cbed6e7844808d0fc79a30b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48906
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* runner: Test session IDs over 32 bytes.
The session ID field cannot exceed 32 bytes, and we size various buffers
based on this. Test that our parsers correctly handle this.
Also fix the -wait-for-debugger flag. I broke it recently by removing
the statusShimStarted message.
Change-Id: I29bb177f29a79bb4904fb5ba3cedfb0b6b856061
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48907
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Refer to RFCs consistently.
We were a mix of "RFC1234" and "RFC 1234". Apparently there is actually
an answer for this, which is with a space textually and without a space
in the citation/reference tag:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7322#section-3.5
Change-Id: I0c44023163fe3a2a3ffe28cbc644d4c952dc8f1e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48965
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Linkify RFCs in documentation.
Change-Id: If42bc55c1381dc50dd1125c2780edc6cafa964cb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48966
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Add a CBB_add_zeros helper.
We fill in placeholder values of all zeros fairly often in TLS now,
as workarounds for messages being constructed in the wrong order.
draft-12 of ECH adds even more of these. Add a helper so we don't need
to interrupt an || chain with a memset.
Change-Id: Id4f9d988ee67598645a01637cc9515b475c1aec2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48909
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Do not rely on ASN1_STRING being NUL-terminated.
This imports part of the fix for CVE-2021-3712, commits
d9d838ddc0ed083fb4c26dd067e71aad7c65ad16,
5f54e57406ca17731b9ade3afd561d3c652e07f2,
23446958685a593d4d9434475734b99138902ed2,
and bb4d2ed4091408404e18b3326e3df67848ef63d0 from upstream. The
others will be imported in follow-up CLs.
Change-Id: Ic35aeb3895935ee94b82a295efade32782e8d1bc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49005
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
* Fix i2v_GENERAL_NAME to not assume NUL terminated strings
See also 174ba8048a7f2f5e1fca31cfb93b1730d9db8300 from upstream. This
differs from the upstream CL in that:
- We don't silently drop trailing NULs.
- As a NUL-terminated C string, the empty string is a non-NULL pointer
to an array containing a zero byte. Use the latter consistently.
Change-Id: I99c6c4c26be5a1771c56c6ab356425f1b85be41d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49006
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Add some tests for name constraints.
Change-Id: I51606bb7e4674716ffb6688b3a8e69db3f014546
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49007
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Rewrite name constraints matching with CBS.
See also 8393de42498f8be75cf0353f5c9f906a43a748d2 from upstream and
CBS-2021-3712. But rather than do that, I've rewritten it with CBS, so
it's a bit clearer. The previous commit added tests.
Change-Id: Ie52e28f07b9bf805c8730eab7be5d40cb5d558b6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49008
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* OPENSSL_strndup should not return NULL given {NULL, 0}.
The NUL-terminated representation of the empty string is a non-NULL
one-byte array, not NULL. This fills in the last of the empty string
cases in https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49006/
Change-Id: I66c09dc3223f762b708612987b26c90e41e27c4a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49009
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Fix typo.
Subsequent CLs will add some fuzzers, etc., that'll help with catching
this.
Change-Id: I10a8e4b2f23ffd07b124e725c1f7454e7ea6f2dd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49025
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Fix some error-handling in i2v functions.
See upstream commits:
32f3b98d1302d4c0950dc1bf94b50269b6edbd95
432f8688bb72e21939845ac7a69359ca718c6676
7bb50cbc4af78a0c8d36fdf2c141ad1330125e2f
8c74c9d1ade0fbdab5b815ddb747351b8b839641
Change-Id: Iff614260c1b1582856edb4ae7a226f2e07537698
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49045
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Run X509_print in the certificate fuzzer.
Given the error handling issues in the previous CL, we'll probably be
chasing down bugs in there for a while.
Change-Id: I7a219e0fe2496f602d38b4bd0fcd5585ebd72cb7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49046
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Merge in OpenSSL's X.509 corpus.
Ran the following command at OpenSSL commit
18622c7625436d7f99c0f51895c4d3cea233c62e:
./build-fuzz/fuzz/cert -merge=1 -max_len=10000 fuzz/cert_corpus/ ~/openssl/fuzz/corpora/x509
Change-Id: I22c4051351138736a0fa0202c0977ca9afc6924c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49047
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Deduplicate our three ServerHello parsers.
We do this enough that it's worth extracting a common parser. And this
gives a struct we can pass around. Note this moves the server extensions
block parsing out of ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext.
I've also consolidated a few error conditions to tighten the code up a
bit: the TLS 1.2 code distinguishes unknown from unadvertised cipher,
while the TLS 1.3 code didn't. And seeing the wrong legacy version
number in TLS 1.3 is really just a syntax error since it's not the
version field anymore. (RFC8446 specifies the value.)
Change-Id: Ia2f44ff9a3899b5a594569f1b258f2b487930496
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48908
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Make ssl_parse_extensions a little easier to use.
std::initializer_list appears to work by instantiating a T[N] at the
call site (which is what we were doing anyway), so I don't believe there
is a runtime dependency.
This also adds a way for individual entries to turn themselves off,
which means we don't need to manually check for some unsolicited
extensions.
Change-Id: I40f79b6a0e9c005fc621f4a798fe201bfbf08411
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48910
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Avoid re-hashing the transcript multiple times.
tls13_init_key_schedule calls InitHash internally, but we also call
InitHash earlier at various times. On the client, we do it early to
handle HelloRetryRequest and 0-RTT. ECH draft-12 will also need to do it
early. Apparently we do it early on the server too.
Probably tls13_init_key_schedule doesn't need to call InitHash, but for
now, it is an easy check in SSLTranscript.
Change-Id: I5473047c1f29bdeb60901e4e6e80979e592bd6e9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48911
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Work around yet another MSVC 2015 SFINAE bug.
Although we defined a CBS -> Span<const uint8_t> conversion, MSVC 2015
keeps trying to call the Span(const Container&) constructor. It seems to
not correctly SFINAE the existence of data() and size() members unless
the expression is inlined into the default template argument.
Change-Id: I4e88f820b78ce72ad1b014b5bae0830bc7d099d4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48945
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Benchmark RSA private key parsing.
We do non-trivial work when parsing RSA private keys (RSA_check_key)
and, in some consumers, this is performance-sensitive.
Bug: b/192484677
Change-Id: Ic27f5f11d8bd030de77dd500a826fb2dd7c5b75d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49105
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Make RSA_check_key more than 2x as fast.
The bulk of RSA_check_key is spent in bn_div_consttime, which is a naive
but constant-time long-division algorithm for the few places that divide
by a secret even divisor: RSA keygen and RSA import. RSA import is
somewhat performance-sensitive, so pick some low-hanging fruit:
The main observation is that, in all but one call site, the bit width of
the divisor is public. That means, for an N-bit divisor, we can skip the
first N-1 iterations of long division because an N-1-bit remainder
cannot exceed the N-bit divisor.
One minor nuisance is bn_lcm_consttime, used in RSA keygen has a case
that does *not* have a public bit width. Apply the optimization there
would leak information. I've implemented this as an optional public
lower bound on num_bits(divisor), which all but that call fills in.
Before:
Did 5060 RSA 2048 private key parse operations in 1058526us (4780.2 ops/sec)
Did 1551 RSA 4096 private key parse operations in 1082343us (1433.0 ops/sec)
After:
Did 11532 RSA 2048 private key parse operations in 1084145us (10637.0 ops/sec) [+122.5%]
Did 3542 RSA 4096 private key parse operations in 1036374us (3417.7 ops/sec) [+138.5%]
Bug: b/192484677
Change-Id: I893ebb8886aeb8200a1a365673b56c49774221a2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49106
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* NUL is not printable.
strchr is interprets the trailing NUL as part of the string, so
is_printable thought NUL was allowed. Just write the code in the obvious
way and let the compiler figure it out. (It seems to make a clever
bitmask or something.)
Update-Note: ASN1_mbstring_ncopy will no longer allow PrintableString
for strings containing NUL.
Change-Id: I3675191ceb44c06f0ac7b430f88272cabf392d35
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49065
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Include SHA512-256 in EVP_get_digestbyname and EVP_MD_do_all.
Change-Id: I25a1a58589ec8843da4d1955d8fec38561f13ec9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49125
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Rewrite ASN1_PRINTABLE_type and add tests.
The old loop read one byte past the length. It also stopped the loop
too early on interior NUL. See also upstream's
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16433, though I've opted to
rewrite the function entirely rather than use their fix.
Also deduplicate the PrintableString check.
Change-Id: Ia8bd282047c2a2ed1d5e71a68a3947c7c108df95
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49066
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Remove V_ASN1_APP_CHOOSE.
V_ASN1_APP_CHOOSE has been discouraged by OpenSSL since 2000:
https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=blob;f=CHANGES;h=824f421b8d331ba2a2009dbda333a57493bedb1e;hb=fb047ebc87b18bdc4cf9ddee9ee1f5ed93e56aff#l10848
Instead, upstream recommends an MBSTRING_* constant.
https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID.html
This function is a bit overloaded:
MBSTRING_* means "Decode my input from this format and then re-encode it
using whatever string type best suits the NID (usually UTF8String, but
some NIDs require PrintableString)".
V_ASN1_APP_CHOOSE means "This is a Latin-1 string. Without looking at
the NID, pick one of PrintableString, IA5String, or T61String".
The latter is almost certainly not what callers want. If they want a
particular type, they can always force it by passing a particular
V_ASN1_* constant. This removes the only use of ASN1_PRINTABLE_type
within the library, though there is one external use still.
Update-Note: V_ASN1_APP_CHOOSE is removed. I only found one use, which
has been fixed.
Change-Id: Id36376dd0ec68559bbbb366e2305d42be5ddac67
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49067
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Make most of crypto/x509 opaque.
This unexports X509, X509_CINF, X509_NAME_ENTRY, X509_NAME, X509_OBJECT,
X509_LOOKUP_METHOD, X509_STORE, X509_LOOKUP, and X509_STORE_CTX.
Note this means X509_STORE_CTX can no longer be stack-allocated.
Update-Note: Patch cl/390055173 into the roll that includes this. This
unexports most of the X.509 structs, aligning with OpenSSL. Use the
accessor APIs instead.
Bug: 425
Change-Id: I53e915bfae3b8dc4b67642279d0e54dc606f2297
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48985
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Remove SSL_set_verify_result.
Follow-up from https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10485 that I
forgot about. It's been removed from netty-tcnative.
Change-Id: Ic4b97b30787962b78a69911a6e3cd28647546f59
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49145
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Reword SSL_get0_ech_name_override documentation.
Hopefully it's a little clearer that this may be called whether or not
ECH is offered. (And whether or not it's a server.)
Bug: 275
Change-Id: I39c8ce5758543a0cfda84652b3fc0a5b9669fd0a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49165
Reviewed-by: Matt Mueller <mattm@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
* Update to draft-ietf-tls-esni-13.
Later CLs will clean up the ClientHello construction a bit (draft-12
avoids computing ClientHelloOuter twice). I suspect the transcript
handling on the client can also be simpler, but I'll see what's
convenient after I've changed how ClientHelloOuter is constructed.
Changes of note between draft-10 and draft-13:
- There is now an ECH confirmation signal in both HRR and SH. We don't
actually make much use of this in our client right now, but it
resolves a bunch of weird issues around HRR, including edge cases if
HRR applies to one ClientHello but not the other.
- The confirmation signal no longer depends on key_share and PSK, so we
don't have to work around a weird ordering issue.
- ech_is_inner is now folded into the main encrypted_client_hello code
point. This works better with some stuff around HRR.
- Padding is moved from the padding extension, computed with
ClientHelloInner, to something we fill in afterwards. This makes it
easier to pad up the whole thing to a multiple of 32. I've accordingly
updated to the latest recommended padding construction, and updated
the GREASE logic to match.
- ech_outer_extensions is much easier to process because the order is
required to be consistent. We were doing that anyway, and now a simple
linear scan works.
- ClientHelloOuterAAD now uses an all zero placeholder payload of the
same length. This lets us simplify the server code, but, for now, I've
kept the client code the same. I'll follow this up with a CL to avoid
computing ClientHelloOuter twice.
- ClientHelloOuterAAD is allowed to contain a placeholder PSK. I haven't
filled that in and will do it in a follow-up CL.
Bug: 275
Change-Id: I7464345125c53968b2fe692f9268e392120fc2eb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/48912
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Fix calculation of draft-13 ECH confirmation signal.
Apparently both we and Go flipped the parameter order for HKDF-Extract
relative to the HKDF spec. (The spec orders the salt before the key.)
Not sure how that happened.
Found doing interop testing with Stephen Farrell's implementation.
https://pkg.go.dev/golang.org/x/crypto/hkdf#Extract
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5869#section-2.2
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-esni-13#section-7.2
Bug: 275
Change-Id: I40a7d53b45cb548e93e6a7ae235e98e55dec4a7a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49185
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Revert "Guard use of sdallocx with BORINGSSL_SDALLOCX"
This reverts commit 80df7398ce52574801821ce7a76c031c35d6b882.
See https://github.com/grpc/grpc/issues/25450#issuecomment-910806034
Even if we want to do this, turns out that we still need the weak symbol
in order to work in important environments.
Change-Id: I50b9aef0cfe7ed70bda433c3046d46f194636d54
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49205
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Switch to the new, simpler WHATWG URL formulation.
In light of
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/blink-dev/c/7QN5nxjwIfM/m/q9dw9MxoAwAJ,
the WHATWG URL parser is now more restrictive about which strings are
valid DNS names. The final component may not be numeric. Align the
ECHConfig validator with this.
Bug: 275
Change-Id: Iea2a3d9a7fee5bffc683da99274c54d60379be9e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49225
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Silence a GCC false positive warning.
GCC 11.2.1 reportedly warns that CTR_DRBG_init may be passed an
uninitialized personalization buffer. This appears to be a false
positive, because personalization_len will be zero. But it's easy enough
to zero-initialize it, so silence the warning.
Bug: 432
Change-Id: I20f6b74e09f19962e8cae37d45090ff3d1c0215d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49245
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
* Update comment for ECH draft-13.
Bug: 275
Change-Id: I66c0d099f9fe6172c60cbf1f512b90f3b2bbb897
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49285
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Check for __TRUSTY__ instead of TRUSTY.
Meant to do this shortly after filing the bug but forgot.
Bug: 377
Change-Id: Ic5a5c167a7b6745599e3a32c4792b66ebbb2dee0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49265
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* acvptool: add hmacDRBG support
Change-Id: I63ecaaaa8ec339688c586a4b2d44e4b91b910b8f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49305
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
* Correctly propagate errors in i2d functions.
tasn_enc.c was missing lots of error checks and mixed up 0 and -1
returns. Document all the internal calling conventions, as best as I can
tell, and fix things up.
There are also error cases it forgets to check (it generally does not
notice missing non-OPTIONAL fields). This CL only addresses errors it
already tries to report. Subsequent CLs will add in the missing error
cases. And then if it all sticks, I'm hoping we can rewrite this with
CBB. Rewriting tsan_dec.c to CBS would also be good, but that will be
more difficult as we need to clear out BER first.
Update-Note: Some error cases which were silently misinterpreted as
missing OPTIONAL elements will now cause encoding to fail.
Bug: 429
Change-Id: Ibbb3eba08eb8f8f878930c9456edc8c74479aade
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49345
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Fix x509_name_ex_i2d error-handling.
This function forgot to handle errors in ASN1_item_ex_i2d. It also
checked x509_name_canon for ret < 0, when x509_name_canon returns a
boolean. For consistency, I've switched to x509_name_encode to return a
boolean as well. It doesn't actually need to return a length because
it's responsible for filling in a->bytes.
(This is also far from thread-safe, but I'll figure out what to do there
separately.)
Bug: 429
Change-Id: I1dddeab320018be4b837f95001cbeeba4e25f0a1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49346
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Check for invalid CHOICE selectors in i2d functions.
This handles normal CHOICE types. A follow-up CL will handle MSTRING and
ANY types.
Update-Note: An invalid CHOICE object (e.g. GENERAL_NAME) will now fail
when encoded, rather than be silently omitted. In particular, CHOICE
objects are default-initialized by tasn_new.c in an empty -1 state.
Structures containing a required CHOICE field can no longer be encoded
without filling in the CHOICE.
Bug: 429
Change-Id: I7011deadf518ddc344a56b07a0e268ceaae17fe0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49347
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Correctly handle invalid ASN1_OBJECTs when encoding.
asn1_ex_i2c actually does have an error condition, it just wasn't being
handled.
628b3c7f2fdf68519c27dc087c400ca616616f4e, imported from upstream's
f3f8e72f494b36d05e0d04fe418f92b692fbb261, tried to check for OID-less
ASN1_OBJECTs and return an error. But it and the upstream change didn't
actually work. -1 in this function means to omit the object, so OpenSSL
was silently misinterpreting the input structure.
This changes the calling convention for asn1_ex_i2c to support this. It
is, unfortunately, a little messy because:
1. One cannot check for object presense without walking the
ASN1_ITEM/ASN1_TEMPLATE structures. You can *almost* check if *pval
is NULL, but ASN1_BOOLEAN is an int with -1 to indicate an omitted
optional. There are also FBOOLEAN/TBOOLEAN types that omit FALSE/TRUE
for DEFAULT. Thus, without more invasive changes, asn1_ex_i2c must be
able to report an omitted element.
2. While the i2d functions report an omitted element by successfully
writing zero bytes, i2c only writes the contents. It thus must
distinguish between an omitted element and an element with
zero-length contents.
3. i2c_ASN1_INTEGER and i2c_ASN1_BIT_STRING return zero on error rather
than -1. Those error paths are not actually reachable because they
only check for NULL. In fact, OpenSSL has even unexported them. But I
found a few callers. Rather than unwind all this and change the
calling convention, I've just made it handle 0 and map to -1 for now.
It's all a no-op anyway, and hopefully we can redo all this with CBB
later.
I've just added an output parameter for now.
In writing tests, I also noticed that the hand-written i2d_ASN1_OBJECT
and i2d_ASN1_BOOLEAN return the wrong value for errors, so I've fixed
that.
Update-Note: A default-constructed object with a required ASN1_OBJECT
field can no longer be encoded without initializing the ASN1_OBJECT.
Note this affects X509: the signature algorithm is an ASN1_OBJECT. Tests
that try to serialize an X509_new() must fill in all required fields.
(Production code is unlikely to be affected because the output was
unparsable anyway, while tests sometimes wouldn't notice.)
Bug: 429
Change-Id: I04417f5ad6b994cc5ccca540c8a7714b9b3af33d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49348
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Reject -1 types in ASN1_TYPE and MSTRINGs when encoding.
See https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/16538
Update-Note: A default-constructed object with a required ANY or
string-like CHOICE field cannot be encoded until the field is specified.
Note this affects i2d_X509: notBefore and notAfter are string-like
CHOICEs in OpenSSL.
Bug: 429
Change-Id: I97d971fa588ab72be25a4c1eb7310ed330f16c4f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49349
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
* Reject missing required fields in i2d functions.
See also 006906cddda37e24a66443199444ef4476697477 from OpenSSL, though
this CL uses a different strategy from upstream. Upstream makes
ASN1_item_ex_i2d continue to allow optionals and checks afterwards at
every non-optional call site. This CL pushes down an optional parameter
and says functions cannot omit items unless explicitly allowed.
I think this is a better default, though it is a larger change. Fields
are only optional when they come from an ASN1_TEMPLATE with the OPTIONAL
flag. Upstream's strategy misses top-level calls.
This CL additionally adds checks for optional ASN1_TEMPLATEs in contexts
where it doesn't make sense. Only fields of SEQUENCEs and SETs may be
OPTIONAL, but the ASN1_ITEM/ASN1_TEMPLATE split doesn't quite match
ASN.1 itself. ASN1_TEMPLATE is additionally responsible for
explicit/implicit tagging, and SEQUENCE/SET OF. That means CHOICE arms
and the occasional top-level type (ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE) use ASN1_TEMPLATE
but will get confused if marked optional.
As part of this, i2d_FOO(NULL) now returns -1 rather than "successfully"
writing 0 bytes. If we want to allow NULL at the top-level, that's not
too hard to arrange, but our CBB-based i2d functions do not.
Update-Note: Structures with missing mandatory fields can no longer be
encoded. Note that, apart from the cases already handled by preceding
CLs, tasn_new.c will fill in non-NULL empty objects everywhere. The main
downstream impact I've seen of this particular change is in combination
with other bugs. Consider a caller that does:
GENERAL_NAME *name = GENERAL_NAME_new();
name->type = GEN_DNS;
name->d.dNSName = DoSomethingComplicated(...);
Suppose DoSomethingComplicated() was actually fallible and returned
NULL, but the caller forgot to check. They'd now construct a
GENERAL_NAME with a missing field. Previously, this would silently
serialize some garbage (omitted field) or empty string. Now we fail to
encode, but the true error was the uncaught DoSomethingComplicated()
failure. (Which likely was itself a bug.)
Bug: 429
Change-Id: I37fe618761be64a619be9fdc8d416f24ecbb8c46
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49350
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Don't read it->funcs without checking it->itype.
it->funcs is only an ASN1_AUX for ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE and
ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE. Fortunately, the other possible types for it->funcs
are larger than ASN1_AUX and we don't touch the result when we
shouldn't, so this is merely a strict aliasing violation.
Change-Id: I29e94249e0b137fe8df0b16254366ae6705c8784
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49351
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Remove ASN1_OP_I2D_* callbacks.
These are a little odd with the ASN1_ENCODING paths. And there were some
bugs previously around CHOICE types. Nothing defines them, inside or
outside BoringSSL, so remove them.
Change-Id: Id2954fef8ee9637f36f7511b51dc0adc2557e3ba
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49352
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Add maskHash to RSA_PSS_PARAMS for compat
This CL adds a maskHash member to the rsa_pss_params_st struct for
increased compatibility with OpenSSL: https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/main:third_party/perl/c/include/openssl/rsa.h;l=282-289
Node.js recently began to make use of this member in https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/39851
and without this member Electron sees compilation errors.
Change-Id: Ibd18a31605b0a715edb279a3bca4b4f05e679767
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49365
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
* Fix BN_prime_checks_for_validation to align with false-positive rate.
This doesn't affect RSA key generation, which uses
BN_prime_checks_for_generation.
Change-Id: Ibf32c0c4bc9fed369e8f8a1efea72c5bd39185a9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49426
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
* Clarify that TLS sessions are not application sessions.
Having APIs named "session" and "ID" appears to be far too tempting for
developers, mistaking it as some application-level notion of session.
Update the documentation, in hopes of discouraging this mistake.
Change-Id: Ifd9516287092371d4701114771eff6640df1bcb0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49405
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Fix the TLS fuzzers for ECH draft-13.
Replace the hardcoded ECH config, which wasn't updated for draft-13,
with a call to SSL_marshal_ech_config.
Bug: 275, oss-fuzz:38054
Change-Id: I10c12b22015c9c0cb90dd6185eb375153a2531f4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49445
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Refresh fuzzer corpus for ECH draft-13.
Bug: 275
Change-Id: I3a89bd31b6198c9cb2e40835219fa9f248a69c9b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49446
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Add FIPS counters for AES-GCM in EVP_AEAD.
BUG=b/158221316
Change-Id: I42693f760aa2852902d72622e109c5d9cac2c4d9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49485
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
* Ignore SIGPIPE in the bssl tool.
Bug: 435
Change-Id: I0ed94d40d04ebc26c9996dfe2b947a6e2f140a89
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49465
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* acvptool: add CS3 support.
CS3 is ciphertext-stealing variant three from SP 800-38A.
Change-Id: I992dc22778c91efad361f25ff65ae5966fc447c6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49505
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
* Unwind remnants of ASN1_TFLG_NDEF.
The i2d functions internally take a tag/class pair of parameters. If tag
is not -1, we override the tag with (tag, class). Otherwise, class is
ignored. (class is inconsistently called aclass or iclass.)
Historically, the remaning bits of class were repurposed to pass extra
flags down the structure. These had to be preserved in all recursive
calls, so the functions take apart and reassemble the two halves of
aclass/iclass. The only such flag was ASN1_TFLG_NDEF, which on certain
types, caused OpenSSL to encode indefinite-length encoding. We removed
this in https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/43889.
Due to these flags, if tag == -1, class should default to zero. However,
X509_NAME's callbacks pass -1, -1, instead of -1, 0, effectively setting
all flags. This wasn't noticed because none of the types below X509_NAME
pay attention to ASN1_TFLG_NDEF.
This CL does two things: First, it unwinds the remainder of the flags
machinery. If we ever need flags, we should pass it as a distinct
argument. Second, it fixes the X509_NAME calls and asserts that -1 is
always paired with 0.
Change-Id: I285a73a06ad16980617fe23d5ea7f260fc5dbf16
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49385
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Speed up constant-time base64 decoding.
I was inspired to look at this again recently and noticed we could do a
bit better. Instead of a tower of selects, rely on all the cases being
mutually exclusive and use the ret |= mask & value formulation without
loss in clarity. We do need to fixup the invalid case slightly, but
since that computation is mostly independent, I'm guessing the CPU and
compiler are able to schedule it effectively.
Before:
Did 251000 base64 decode operations in 2002569us (159.4 MB/sec)
After:
Did 346000 base64 decode operations in 2005426us (219.5 MB/sec) [+37.7%]
Change-Id: I542167202fd4e94c93dd5a2519a97bc388072c89
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49525
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Allow PKCS7_sign to work for signing kernel modules.
Linux module signing uses PKCS#7 / CMS because everything is awful and
broken. In order to make the lives of kernel developers easier, support
the calling pattern that the kernel uses to sign modules.
The kernel utility was written at a time when PKCS#7 was hard coded to
use SHA-1 for signing in OpenSSL and it reflects this: you can only
specify “sha1” on the command line, for example. As of OpenSSL 1.1.1, at
least, OpenSSL uses SHA-256 and thus so does this change.
Change-Id: I32b036123a0d8b272ec9e1c0130c45bf3ed0d2c7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49545
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
* aarch64: Add missing LR validation in 'vpaes_cbc_encrypt'
There is an obvious bug there: upon entry to 'vpaes_cbc_encrypt'
LR may get signed. However, on the 'cbc_abort' path the LR is
not going to be unsigned before 'ret' is executed.
Found by manual code inspection.
Co-authored-by: Russ Butler <russ.butler@arm.com>
Change-Id: I646cdfaee28db59aafbbd412d4bb6ba022eff15b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49605
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
* Keep EVP_CIPHER/EVP_MD lookup and do_all functions in sync
Node seems uncommonly sensitive to this, so let's write these functions
in a way that stays in sync and test this. See also
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49585
This does incur a cost across all BoringSSL consumers that use these
functions: as a result of Node indiscriminately exposing every cipher,
we end up pulling more and more ciphers into these getters. But that
ship sailed long ago, so, instead, document that EVP_get_cipherby*
should not be used by size-conscious callers.
EVP_get_digestby* probably should have the same warning, but I've left
it alone for now because we don't quite have the same proliferation of
digests as ciphers. (Though there are things in there, like MD4, that
ought to be better disconnected.)
Change-Id: I61ca406c146279bd05a52bed6c57200d1619c5da
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49625
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Fix CRYPTO_malloc, etc., definitions.
In upstream, these functions take file and line number arguments. Update
ours to match. Guessing almost no one uses these, or we'd have caught
this earlier.
Change-Id: Ic09f8d8274065ac02efa78e70c215b87fa765b9f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49665
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Brittain <bwb@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
* Add log tag for Trusty.
Trusty's TLOGE macro nowadays expects TLOG_TAG to be defined
as the log tag to use.
Change-Id: I18121287ba51698d354323027d5382c8406f0b99
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49685
Commit-Queue: Pete Bentley <prb@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
* Add note to HMAC test vectors from NIST
All the test vectors testing key length greater than the block length
were mislabelled as key length being equal to the block length. Add a
note to these test vectors indicating they are directly from the NIST
tests with the misleading input intact.
Change-Id: I9fe87971265ad48e9b835fccbe92306e1670b4d6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49705
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
* Switch x509_test.cc to modify the existing X509_VERIFY_PARAM.
There are two ways to configure an X509_STORE_CTX after
X509_STORE_CTX_init. One can either modify the already initialized
X509_VERIFY_PARAM or replace it. Modifying the existing one is more
common. Replacing it actually misses some defaults. (See issue #441 for
details.)
In preparation for actually being able to test changes to the default,
switch tests to that model. In doing so, no longer need to explicitly
configure the depth and can test that default. (Though we should write
tests for the depth at some point.)
Bug: 439, 441
Change-Id: I254a82585d70d44eb94920f604891ebfbff4af4c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49745
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Enable X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST by default.
The OpenSSL X.509 verifier lacks a proper path builder. When there are
two paths available for a certificate, we pick one without looking at
expiry, etc.
In scenarios like one below, X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST will prefer
Leaf -> Intermediate -> Root1. Otherwise, we will prefer
Leaf -> Intermediate -> Root1Cross -> Root2:
Root2
|
Root1 Root1Cross
\ /
Intermediate
|
Leaf
If Root2 is expired, as with Let's Encrypt, X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST
will find the path we want. Same if Root1Cross is expired. (Meanwhile,
if Root1 is expired, TRUSTED_FIRST will break and leaving it off works.
TRUSTED_FIRST does not actually select chains with validity in mind. It
just changes the semi-arbitrary decision.)
OpenSSL 1.1.x now defaults to X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST by default, so
match them. Hopefully the shorter chain is more likely to be correct.
Update-Note: X509_verify_cert will now build slightly different chains
by default. Hopefully, this fixes more issues than it causes, but there
is a risk of trusted_first breaking other scenarios. Those scenarios
will also break OpenSSL 1.1.x defaults, so hopefully this is fine.
Bug: 439
Change-Id: Ie624f1f7e85a9e8c283f1caf24729aef9206ea16
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49746
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ryan Sleevi <rsleevi@chromium.org>
* Remove X509_STORE_set0_additional_untrusted.
This was added in
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/12980/, but does
not appear to be used anymore. The corresponding function does not exist
in OpenSSL.
This simplifies the tests slightly, some of which were inadvertently
specifying the boolean and some weren't.
Change-Id: I9b956dcd9f7151910f93f377d207c88273bd9ccf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/49747
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
* Extract common rotl/rotr functions.
We have a ton of per-file rotation functions, often with generic names
that do not tell you whether they are uint32_t vs uint…
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OpenSSL has added
RSA_get0_pss_params(temporally after openssl/openssl#10217 (comment)), which allows adding RSA-PSS params to the existingasymmetricKeyDetailsproperty.Fixes: #39837
Refs: openssl/openssl#10568